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East Asian Civilisation II; Term 1 Essay, Robert Lindsay

Discuss the reasons for the shortcomings of nineteenth century Chinese ‘self-strengthening’.

INTRODUCTION:

A period of ‘self-strengthening’ took place in China in the second half of the nineteenth century (1861-95). This period saw efforts made by many Chinese statesmen, loyal to the Qing dynasty, to bring modernising changes to education, international relations and technology. Some improvements were made but there were difficulties in the implementation of new ideas. In this essay I will outline the main aim of the self-strengthening movement, the key figures and their achievements. I will then cover the weaknesses of self-strengthening and reasons for its shortcomings which include chiefly socio-political and military setbacks.

MAIN AIM:

The aim of self-strengthening was to preserve Confucian culture while adopting and adapting Western learning and technology to suit China’s needs. The need to do so had been made apparent to many of the scholar-generals after their experience in warfare and the exposure to the use of modern weaponry (guns, cannons and ships). The scholar-general Zeng Guofan who later became the supervisor of the provincial examinations in Sichuan wanted to enable a ‘Tongzhi Restoration’. He and others hoped to strengthen the country in preparation for the rule of the child Emperor Tongzhi. While modernising the essential elements they nonetheless wished to retain the Qing dynasty in power. It was important particularly to the early proponents to retain an adherence to Confucian philosophy while making use of this knowledge. The practical aims of the self-strengthening movement were further expressed by Feng Guifen, a protégé of Zeng Guofan, who argued (in essays to Zeng) that: ‘China must learn to strengthen itself (ziqiang) by including foreign languages, mathematics and science in the curriculum’ (Spence 1990, p197). To build China’s strength he advised the building of shipyards and arsenals and the hiring of foreign advisors to train the Chinese in the manufacture of machinery arms and ships.

KEY FIGURES/ ACHIEVEMENTS:

It may be helpful firstly to clarify the relations between the leading players in the self-strengthening movement and the extent of their authority as follows: ‘The self-strengthening movement began in the early Tung-chih (Tongzhi) period, originating chiefly in the provinces but enjoying the strong support of the court. It was Li Hung-chang (Li Hongzhang) who first proposed the teaching of mathematics and the sciences at a government ‘interpreters college’, and who founded China’s earliest modern arsenals; it was Tso Tsung-t’ang (Zuo Zongtang) who planned a large ship-building program. Li and Tso were stoutly backed, however, by the Tsungli Yamen (Zongli Yamen) at a time when Prince Kung (Gong) was at the height of his power and when Wen-hsiang (Wenxiang) was still in good health. The development of ‘regionalism’ - the administrative leeway that the governors-general and governors enjoyed regarding the temporary imperial armies and the likin - did not handicap the co-operation between Peking and the provinces in the new projects’ (Chu 1994 pp 49-50)

Zeng Guofan (1811-72):

As stated above Zeng was the key figure who defined the ideological and philosophical aims of self-strengthening and he continued to exert an influence on the thinking of figures such as Zuo Zongtang and Li Hongzhang. Zeng was an Hunanese scholar-general who fought with the government forces during the Taiping rebellion (1851-1864). His role after the defeat of this rebellion was that of the suppression of the Nian rebellion (1853-68). By this time he had become well aware of the need to strengthen Chinese military technology and he initiated the purchase, through a trusted subordinate Yung Wing, of machine tools from the United States which were combined with former resources into the building of an arsenal and shipyard at Anking near Shanghai. These were run initially by the aid of foreign experts but later independently.

Zuo Zongtang (1812-85):

Established a second arsenal and shipyard at Fuzhou in Fujian province. Not only were these shipyards established but also schools were founded for the study of mechanical skills along with the translation of technical works. The ships produced included steamships and gunboats. Zuo was transferred shortly after this to suppress Muslim rebels in the Northwest otherwise he might have managed to apply himself to continuing to build up China’s naval strength. As it was his success as a military leader brought to an end the spate of rebellions which had beset Qing China since the Taiping rebellion in 1851. His final success in crushing the Muslim (Panthay)rebellion (1853-73), was achieved in the city of Suzhou in north-west Ganzu: ‘...which he took in November 1973, killing most of the defenders and burning large areas within the walls. Although some of the Muslim rebels fled even farther west to Hami and would take years more to conquer, the provinces of China proper were now pacified. For the first time since 1850, China could once again, with the ambiguous exception of the treaty ports, be considered unified under Qing rule’ (Spence 1990, p 193)

Prince Gong (1833-98) & Wenxiang (1818-76):

Prince Gong, trusted advisor of the Empress Dowager Cixi and uncle of the child emperor Tongzhi, presided over the Zongli Yamen - a new agency set up in Peking in 1861 for the management of the business of foreign countries. Prince Gong and his assistant Wenxiang (who served as grand councillor and minister of war) made efforts to increase China’s naval strength and to redefine China’s status and sovereignty according to the terms of international law. They attempted the purchase of a British fleet of seven steamers and one store ship in 1862, however over conflict with regard to the chain of command over the hired British officers and crew this arrangement was cancelled. A negotiation which met with more success was the obtaining of compensation from Russia after their incursion in 1864 into Chinese territorial waters in the Prussian-Danish war. This success prompted Prince Gong to publish copies the translation of ‘Wheatons Elements of International Law’. This was quite a radical step which indicates that his view had become more pragmatic and less insular than many of the ruling elite within the Qing ruling class. Between 1862 and 1867 Prince Gong & Wenxiang oversaw the development of firstly an interpreters school in Peking followed by new government sponsored language schools in Shanghai, Canton and Fuzhou. Another radical achievement came with their transformation of the Peking school in 1867 into a full-fledged college: ‘They proposed adding to the curriculum such subjects as mathematics, chemistry, geology, mechanics, and international law, and hiring foreigners as instructors. Despite vigorous protests from conservative senior officials that the Chinese had no need for ‘barbarians as teachers’ to instruct them in ‘trifling arts’.....the reformers carried the day’ (Spence 1990, p 202)

Li Hongzhang (1823-1901):

Li was without doubt the most energetic and effective proponent of the self- strengthening movement. His field of influence was large and his achievements many. Not only did he seek to build up China’s military technology in the form of further arms production in Shanghai and Hoochow and he became a very prominent figure in international relations and diplomacy. As will be mentioned later there was not a strong imperial lead taken in the self-strengthening movement. There were the efforts of the fore-mentioned figures along with the involvement of Prince Gong but it was Li Hongzhang who managed to provide a strong lead for the movement in a multitude of involvements and some notable achievements: ‘As a senior official who had occupied key positions during the campaigns for the suppression of the Taipings and the Niens, Li had formed many friendships among governors-general, governors and lesser officials. As the acknowledged but untitled leader of the Anhwei Army, Li also developed a degree of influence in provinces where units of that army were stationed. But in the last analysis, it was the specific imperial sanction for each of Li’s proposals, as well as his position as imperial commissioner, that accounted for his role as co-ordinator of policy. In the early 1870’s we find him taking remarkable initiative in shaping policy, and for a time it appeared that his programs might, at least in part, be carried out on a national scale’ (Chu 1994 p 50). In the 1860’s he had established an arsenal at Nanking and another with a shipyard at Kiangnan.

In the field of education Li founded a school in Shanghai in 1863 which taught English, mathematics and science. This he later amalgamated with new translator’s school in 1867. As well as this he supported the addition of western learning to the national education and examination system and from the early 1870’s was keen on sending students abroad also: ‘He originally threw his support behind the proposal for an educational mission in the United States, an idea first formulated by Yung Wing and backed by Zeng Guofan. The court gave its consent, and in 1872 the first group of Chinese boys aged twelve to fourteen - many of them the children of employees in China’s new arsenals at Fuzhou, Tianjin and Shanghai - were sent to Hartford, Connecticut’ (Spence 1990 p219). As it turned out these students were not permitted entry to the US naval and military academies as Li had hoped: ‘....but Li Hongzhang henceforth dispatched his most promising students to France, Germany, or Great Britain, where the governments did not object to their receiving technically advanced military and naval training. He also established both a naval and a military academy in Tianjin itself’ (Spence 1990 p220).

As well as his commitment to building up China’s military and naval strength and his support for educational development in crucial areas of western learning and technology Li played a very influential and key role in foreign affairs. He was involved in negotiations with all the major foreign powers encroaching China at one point or another, but despite his wisdom and caution in most of these dealings his efforts in this area in particular and indeed the whole effectiveness of the self-strengthening movement was hindered and weakened by many setbacks as mentioned below.

WEAKNESSES OF THE SELF-STRENGTHENING MOVEMENT:

Socio-Political Setbacks:

Despite the efforts of many provincial statesmen who supported the aims of the self-strengthening movement there was a strong tendency within traditional Chinese society to adhere to a proud backward-looking stance regarding China’s position among other nations. Among some of the Qing dynasty officials there remained the attitude that China had nothing to gain from the foreigners, indeed pride in Confucian culture, the long history of China being the centre of the world and receiving tribute from other nations made it difficult for some senior figures to adjust to the reality of international relations and China’s increasingly weak position. Such views found their expression most plainly in the Purist party (Ch’ing-liu tang) who at times successfully opposed and obstructed the cautious negotiative stance of Li Hongzhang in foreign affairs. They were distrustful and contemptuous of any efforts to negotiate and appease foreign powers and this made the pragmatic diplomatic efforts of Li Hongzhang all the more difficult.

Another setback was the lack of strong imperial leadership from the Emperor which might have galvanised and co-ordinated the self-strengthening movement from above. The initiatives of the figures mentioned above could at times be made within their individual realm of authority, but none of the above (even Prince Gong) had a completely free hand. Self strengthening at its outset had as its objective a ‘Tongzhi Restoration’. The Emperor Tongzhi (1856-75) was only a child during this time of much needed development and died too early to make a real contribution. This was a severe setback in that those who might have hoped for a new Emperor to help them achieve a stronger China were forced (through the political manoeuvring of the Empress Dowager Cixi) to accept her continued rule. This she achieved by adopting her three year old nephew Guangxu and appointing him as Emperor. Further deaths including that of Zeng Guofan in 1872 and Wenxiang in 1876 left much of the impetus for self-strengthening with Li Hongzhang, and much of his progress depended on his influence with the Empress Dowager Cixi.

Cixi was a tough minded, ruthless, vain and proud woman who did not lead the way in the self-strengthening movement but rather alternatively blocked and permitted progress as it fitted her own narrower aims of retaining power and a lavish lifestyle: ‘The vanity and venality of the Empress Dowager are well known. Under her virtual domination of the Court from the 1860’s to her death in 1908, the Ch’ing Court became even more effete and corrupt. Li had to operate in that milieu. He had to please his imperial patroness, or risk political decline or impotence’.....’Li became expert in playing up to Tz’u-hsi’s vanity and greed. The full extent of funds channelled by Li to Tz’u-hsi and her functionaries remains a matter for further investigation, but of the existence of such funds there appears to be little doubt’ (Chu 1994, p 274)

Continuing rebellions during the self-strengthening years included the Muslim (Panthay) rebellion of 1853-73 in the Northwest of China and the further Muslim (Tunghan) rebellion of 1862-74. As mentioned above these absorbed the efforts and resources of the Qing commanded by Zuo Guofan and as such hindered the progress that might otherwise have been made toward further self strengthening. All these rebellions were not only a military inconvenience they also serve to demonstrate the deep social unrest within the various strands of Chinese society. The Qing dynasty rulers were Manchu in origin and retained the vast majority of privileges in education and promotion for the ethnic Manchu. The fore-mentioned scholar generals may have been exceptions - since their leading of Han forces had led to their establishment in positions of power, but they could be regarded by rebels as lackeys of the Manchu. The dissatisfaction of the common people in China was also aroused by the seeming tolerance of the Manchu regime to the encroachments of the western powers. Firstly they had conceded treaty ports and then they seemed incapable of firm action to foreign predations on Chinese interests.

Military Setbacks:

Military defeats in premature engagements with foreign powers revealed China’s weakness. Despite some attempt at strengthening the naval forces China was no match for the foreign powers. This was a fact that Li Hongzhang was aware of: ‘When the French expanded their colonial empire by occupying Hanoi and Haiphong in 1880 - despite Chinese claims to special rights in the area - and began to pressure China for new concessions in Annam (now Vietnam), Li Hongzhang urged caution..’ (Spence 1990, p 221). When Chinese hostilities continued despite this plea the French fleet drew up near the Chinese fleet at Fuzhou and when negotiations broke down defeat came at the hands of the French.

After the Sino-French war (1883-85). Hanoi (which had previously been known as Cochin China) became a French protectorate. Burma was claimed similarly by Britain in 1886, and the seizing of control of Korea by Japan led to conflict which further humiliated China. Conflict with Japan had come previously in 1874 when Japan had sent expeditionary forces to Formosa (Taiwan). At that time - Li had followed tactics of mustering his naval forces without engaging in battle and in the end Japan had accepted a peaceful settlement. The Sino-Japanese war in 1894 was over Korea: ‘In 1894, when the outbreak of a domestic rebellion threatened the Korean king, both China and Japan seized the opportunity to send troops to protect the royal family. The Japanese, who were able to move more troops faster than the Chinese, seized the Korean palace on July 21 and appointed a ‘regent’ loyal to their interests’ (Spence 1990, p 222).

Naval battles ensued but some superior military tactics were employed by the Japanese which resulted in the destruction of many of China’s military and naval resources. Following this humiliating defeat by Japan the self- strengthening movement could be said to have come to its conclusion. Heavy war indemnities were imposed by the Japanese in the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 which saw the era of self-strengthening come to an inglorious end.

CONCLUSION:

It may be seen from the above that self-strengthening was indeed a very necessary aim for China in face of the changes in which she found herself. The movement was setback then by being ‘too little, too late’; lacking strong leadership; hindered by Manchu intransigence on the one hand and rebellions on the other. The death of the Emperor Tongzhi put paid to the hope of a ‘Tongzhi Restoration’ and the military setbacks toward the end of the century revealed the ineffectiveness and inadequacy of China’s military and naval forces. It seems that self-strengthening began too late to rescue the Qing dynasty. It is questionable also of course whether such an outdated and elitist imperial system was worthy of salvation. The key figures mentioned above were acting in the interests of the Qing dynasty but naturally - when facing foreign powers - they were also fighting for China’s interests as a nation. It is to the credit of such figures as Li Hongzhang that so much was achieved despite these setbacks. Despite the efforts of realists such as himself there remained too much complacency and pride among the Qing ruling class for the self-strengthening movement to succeed.

REFERENCES:

Spence, Jonathan D (1990) The Search for Modern China - New York/ London; W.W.Norton & Company

Chu, Samuel C & Kwang-Ching, Liu (1994) Li Hung-chang and China’s early modernization New York, M.E. Sharpe Inc.

(I also made use of lecture notes and for many dates I used a ‘Chronology of Revolutionary China 1839-1960’ handout supplied by Li-Nan Tsai 1 Dec 1997)

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