Why was the North Atlantic Treaty concluded in 1949?

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Warsaw Pact formed the framework for the Cold War until 1990. NATO still survives as a visible reality today. Why was it felt necessary to draw up the Atlantic Pact? How important was the German question? Why did the USA commit to the world role that Great Britain could no longer go on fulfilling? The Atlantic choice cannot be explained wholly by focusing on the span 1947-1949, the period of the containment policy. The analysis must cover a longer time-span, reflecting the whole period, beginning with the ending of WW2 in 1945.

Significantly for the conclusion of the Atlantic Treaty, from 1945 to 1950 a fundamental transformation occurred in the traditional foreign policy of the USA. Cook dubbed it ‘the most profound and important change in American History’[1]. For 150 years, from the days of the Founding fathers to the end of the Second World War, American foreign policy had rested firmly on George Washington’s request to his countrymen to ‘attend to their own affairs and avoid entangling alliances or involvement in the conflicts of Europe’[2]. Despite, or perhaps because of the two world wars that had taken American soldiers across the Atlantic, George Washington’s words of warning were still in 1945 almost as sacred in American politics and foreign policy as the Constitution. But in a hurricane of events, diplomacy and politics in the ‘most crowded and decisive peacetime years of this century[3]’, the United States was thrust, pressed and dragged until they had utterly abandoned their traditional, isolationist inhibition. This process culminated in the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949, which joined America permanently in an entangling military and political alliance with the nations of Western Europe.

Whilst it may appear to have been a seamless progression from the Truman Doctrine to the Marshall Plan to NATO, ‘up the escalator of History[4]’, many Historians believe it was more complicated, sue to factors such as an ‘open wound in the heart of Europe’[5]. Throughout 1945, 1946 and 1947 neither Truman, Vandenberg, Marshall nor anyone else in the American government ‘had any intention of taking America into a European alliance’[6]. Cook asserted that the NATO treaty ‘was far from any American initiative’[7]. The proposal and the constant driving force behind the treaty came from Great Britain’s foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin. Nolfo said ‘based on rational or irrational motives, the Europeans expressed a deeply anxious call for help in the face of a future filled with imponderable dangers’[8]. Within the Truman administration strong doubts and divisions persisted for months over the wisdom and necessity of any alliance with Europe. Post-war events in Europe, particularly the Berlin Blockade, steadily propelled political and public acceptance in the United States an entangling alliance to keep the peace would be essential.

Nolfo believed it was the Second World War that produced the ‘situation from which would spring not just the Cold War but also the Atlantic Pact’[9]. At the epicentre of World War Two in Europe lay the German question. After the war Western Europe and the USSR were terrified that Germany would recover and generate a third world war. What was to be done with Germany to stop this happening? The end of the war was characterised by the inability of the Allies to find an ‘acceptable and lasting solution to this question’[10]. There were two reasons for the failure: the first was the change in the concept of international security due to developments such as the American atomic monopoly. The second reason was the absence of France and Germany from the political stage at the crucial time. France was only included in time to take part in the concluding phase[11]. The Casablanca diktat (the formula of unconditional surrender, imposed by Roosevelt in January 1943) foolishly excluded Germany from the discussions concerning their own future. As a result at the end of a war over the German question, the question of Germany remained unsolved, a ticking time-bomb.

Furthermore, the solutions projected for Germany were of an indistinct and provisional nature: the status created in Germany in 1945 was never going to be long lasting and the manner in which the major powers could interfere in Germany exacerbated the hurt caused by the war.  Many scholars conclude this provisional status ‘indisputably lead to the traumas and crises’[12] in the Europe of the future. Yet at the time it was not considered to be hugely significant. The lack of a solution to the German question precipitated a wider conflict, which later came together into the Cold War, in which Germany remained the frontline of the East West confrontation that resulted in the division of Europe. The German question was a crucial factor in the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. Bullock said the North Atlantic Treaty provided ‘a framework within which developments towards a West German state could now take place[13]’.

In 1946 the United States enjoyed greater security than ever before. It possessed a navy all-powerful in command of the Atlantic and the Pacific, and was the sole holder of the atomic bomb. Yet the Americans realised it would be illusory and unwise to disregard the security problems of others. Washington could see a ‘power vacuum had opened up throughout Europe, under the guise of peace’[14]. It was essential that this new power vacuum had to be filled. Nowhere in post-war Europe was there ‘anything that could be described as power’[15]. The returned democratic governments were struggling simply to demonstrate that they could govern. How would sufficient security be achieved to enable the United Nations peace to be kept? How was the power vacuum to be filled and a balance restored?

The needs of Britain were an important reason why the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. The British knew full well, better than the Americans that they could no longer hold  the balance of power in Europe. The fundamental aim of British post-war policy was ‘to ensure American power was not withdrawn from Europe’[16]. Britain saw it as a necessity for America to inherit the role they had played for nearly two centuries. Bevin saw his primary task as securing such an American commitment to the security of Europe, not in war but to maintain peace.

Perhaps the main reason the North Atlantic Treaty was signed was the deterioration of East-West relations. In the years after World War II, Western leaders saw the policies of the USSR as threatening the stability and peace in Europe. They saw Stalin ‘masterminding the subjugation of Europe and gloating at the inability of the Western allies to deter him in his power-crazed bid for expansion’[17].  The forcible installation of Communist governments throughout Eastern Europe and their ‘support of guerrilla war in Greece and regional separatism in Iran’[18] appeared to many as the first steps of World War III. After World War Two, the USSR ‘succeeded in frightening the nations of Western Europe and the North Atlantic into forming the North Atlantic Treaty Organization‘[19]. Preventing the ‘red menace’ sweeping through Europe was key to the formation of NATO.

Though the USSR and the USA had fought side by side against Hitler they had always been uneasy allies, due to their long held differences. The capitalist West who ideologically opposed Communism had, always regarded the Communist seizure of power in Russia in 1917, and the creation of the Soviet Union, with great hostility. British, American, German, Japanese and other forces had all intervened against the Red forces in the Russian Civil War, 1918-21. America had refused to recognize the USSR until 1933. The Soviets fundamentally opposed Capitalism. They perceived the twentieth century as the century of Communism. It was inevitable that the latent mistrust between the East and the West would re-emerge after Hitler was defeated in 1945, culminating in the Cold War.

There is considerable debate amongst historians over whether the West should have perceived the Soviets such a threat that a permanent, peacetime alliance was necessary. Though Stalin lacked the atomic bomb or the material and economic means to spread Communist power, he had overwhelming, disciplined military might at his disposal and the ‘sinister tentacles’[20] of his machinery of government reaching out from the Kremlin. It was significant that added to this was the political power of the Communist parties throughout Europe, with Communist prestige in 1948 higher in the old Western democracies than it had been. Stalin’s post-war aims are still a source of controversy to historians and certainly were unclear in 1948. It is often said that he aimed not for world order but world revolution. Whilst other historians think Stalin was actually a paranoid dictator, ruling a country decimated by World War Two, terrified that he would lose power to the superior western system of democracy. Revisionist historians have suggested that the Cold War began, and NATO was established, because the Americans ‘overreacted to an exaggerated idea of a Communist threat’[21] in 1945-6, and, by the military build-up that culminated in the North Atlantic Treaty, ‘only fed Stalin’s paranoia about capitalist encirclement’[22].

Stalin had always been determined to achieve a sphere of influence as far west as Germany, a shield for Communism. After the war, it gradually became clearer to the west that he was not about to submit to the restraining influence of some American dominated world body. Between 1945 and 1947 Stalin ‘cynically played along…with the strange western schemes[23]’ using military force to extend Soviet influence. During this period it became clear to the West that they had ‘made a terrible mistake in thinking that Stalin had changed, that his ideas of expansion had disintegrated’[24]. As the cooperation between Soviet and Western powers declined, their relationship inevitably turned into one of competition and rivalry. Truman opposed Stalin’s policies and moved to unite Europe under American leadership. The mutual mistrust grew as Stalin held ‘Blatantly fixed’[25] elections to install puppet Communist governments throughout Eastern Europe (Budapest, Bucharest and Sofia) and Truman refused to send German reparations to the Soviet Union.  The creation of Cominform, a European Communist organization in 1947 led to a further deterioration in east-west relations. Nolfo said the ‘communist parties throughout Europe were placed on the offensive[26]’. Following the London Conference, from 25^th November 1947 to 16^th December 1947, which dissolved into a resounding failure, it became abundantly clear to the West that the Soviets were too obstructive for further cooperation.  By 1947 the West perceived the USSR to be an unashamedly expansionist, military power. Stalin's regime presented an ‘insurmountable obstacle to friendly relations’[27] with the West. It was ‘impossible to go along with the illusion any longer[28]’. Truman said he was ‘tired of babying the soviets[29]’. The West decided they would not fight them by force but limit them by every means possible – containment.

By 1948 in the ‘atmosphere of heightened international tension’[30], America launched the $13-billion European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan) to rebuild Western and Central Europe[31]. Stalin’s decision to reject participation in the Marshall Plan is widely regarded by scholars as a turning point in the development of the Cold War. Cook said ‘the launching of the Marshall plan brought things to a head’[32]. Involvement in the Marshall Plan, originally appeared to be ‘in tune with Soviet Objectives of co-operation with the USA’[33] in trade to rehabilitate the Soviet and East European economies. However, once Stalin realized it was aimed against Communism he responded by accepting the division of Europe and increasing control over the East European Communist parties. Stalin showed how crucial his desire to preserve the Moscow line was when he ‘threatened the Czech leaders to prevent them from accepting Marshall Aid’[34].

In 1948 further crises in Europe added to the atmosphere of instability and tension which lead to the signing of the NATO treaty. There was the Communist coup in Prague February 1948, Soviet pressure in Finland (a friendship pact was signed in April 1948), and most alarmingly for the West, the Soviet pressure on Norway exerted in March 1948. Norway had always been seen as a Western European country so this was extremely disturbing for the West. Bullock said ‘1948 was the key year in east-west relations’[35].

The Berlin Blockade of 1948 was the spark that led to the formation of NATO. America decided that Germany needed a currency reform in June 1948. The circulations of the new currency in Berlin lead to the Soviets blockading West Berlin. Cook called the Berlin Blockade ‘the high point of Stalin’s post-war challenge to the west’[36]. The Soviets aimed to stop the division of Germany. Cook said that ‘in west Berlin the seemingly irresistible force of Stalinist Communist expansion into Europe met head on with an immovable Western determination’[37]. The Western decision to stay in Berlin ‘showed the west was moving to restore strength and security, after that ‘the hinge turned’[38]. What would have happened if there had been a retreat from Berlin? What use would the North Atlantic Treaty have been if Berlin had gone the way of Prague? Stalin eventually backed down, deciding not to shoot the American planes down.

The Berlin blockade directly led to the negotiations between Western Europe, Canada, and the United States between October 1948 and March 1949 that resulted in the North Atlantic Treaty[39]. The main question in the discussions concerning the western search for security was should the USA be permanently committed to Europe? The historic fears of ‘entangling alliances’ Washington spoke of in 1798, the sentiments continued in the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, were a noose around the Americans necks. Evidence this view still persisted is that many historians think that the Marshall Plan was intended to let Europe become wealthy so that America could withdraw. This approach would have been true to their isolationist traditions.

There were differing approaches to European security from those in the West. The Europeans had different priorities to the Americans. The Europeans wished to prevent renewed German aggression and contain the USSR, they wanted permanent American security from both. The USA disagreed in that they wanted to contain the USSR and revive Germany. There was also a difference on the nature of possible US commitment, Europe wanted an automatic commitment, an American guarantee against German aggression but the isolationist USA only wanted to make a limited commitment, not automatic. The Europeans wanted a commitment considerably stronger and more specific than the Americans had yet considered’[40]. Other questions included, was it going to have a structure attached to it in peacetime? Would it be a permanent structure?

Another disagreement was that Western Europe wanted their own security arrangements to show that they could defend themselves, rather than just waiting for the Americans to help them. The British wanted to build a bridge between the USA and Europe but ‘a bridge firmly founded on the continuation Britain’s imperial role’. The French feared the rise of a system of separate stage alliances, in closed sectors, such as to circumscribe France in a continental role. Britain and France signed the Treaty of Dunkirk in March 1947 in which they pledged common defense against aggression. Bevin proposed a Western Union in his speech of 22^nd January 1948.  Their defence concerns led the western European countries ‘to form their own alliance, the Western Union in March 1948’[41]. Great Britain, France and the Benelux countries signed the Brussels Treaty in March 1948. Among its goals was the collective defense of its members. They aimed to associate the United States with it. However, the Americans needed persuading to make the full commitment. Britain used the crises of early 1948 to frighten them into action. They put the Norwegian question to the Americans. Significantly, the USA was forbidden by law to form a peacetime alliance, but the obstacle was removed in the Vandenberg resolution 11 June 1948.

The way that the two regions eventually came together was a reconciliation of the two approaches. The North Atlantic Treaty was formulated upon the model of the Treaty of Rio 1946 between American nations: a united defense against aggression on the premise that an attack “against an American state shall be an attack against all American states”[42]. The original signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty were Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United States. Perhaps the most important part of the treaty was the American troops stationed in Europe. Their presence ensured America would intervene in a European conflict. The troops in Europe were, in effect, there as hostages – the USA would always defend them.

The Alliance was not just a military alliance but also a prevalently political treaty. Nolfo called it a ‘stabilising, political guarantee’[43]. Nolfo said that the Pact could not be wholly explained as a ‘response to definite fears’[44]. He said it was signed because of ‘the need for better structuring of the West…not determined by negative reasons like fear’. John McCloy agreed, stating that NATO 'was not exclusively or even primarily to deter an impending or threatened Soviet military attack'[45]. I think the Atlantic Pact was largely a result of the escalation in east/west tensions and in particular the German question. It was also down to the weakening of British and French power and the fragile state of the European democracies, which meant they needed permanent American protection. It was down to the actions of Stalin which frightened the West. As Link said, the NATO treaty was ‘governed from the outset by the awareness that a strong linking of Europe and America would be necessary[46]’against the Soviets, and at the same West Germany could be ‘irrevocably integrated into the Western camp[47]’, held in check and controlled both politically and economically by the West. 57. Kirkendall said that Washington's Cold War policies ‘did not come into being willy-nilly in response to the Soviet menace’[48].

It was the disparity between the ‘Communist strength, unity and purpose and western European weakness, with little direction’[49] that necessitated the formation of a Western security system. There was not a single event or factor which led to the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty, it was a result of ‘the many concerns inextricably bound together[50]’.

Bibliography

• E.Action, Russia, The Present And The Past, Longman, 1990, Singapore
• A.S Bullock, Hitler and Stalin, Parallel Lives, Harper Collins, 1991, London
• D.Cook, Forging the Alliance: NATO, 1945-1950, London, 1989
• K. Dawisha, Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and Reform: The Great Challenge, Second edition, Cambridge, 1990.
• J.L. Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War, New York, 1987.
• J.L. Gaddis, The USA and the Origins of the cold war 1941-47, Coloumbia, 1972.
• C. Kennedy-Pipe, Russia and the world 1917-1991, Arnold, 1998
• R.S.Kirkendall, The Truman period as a research field: a reappraisal, USA, 1974.
• R.B. Levering, The Cold War 1945-1987, USA, 1988.
• P.G. Lewis, Central Europe since 1945, Longman, London, 1994.
• J.L. Nogee and R.H. Donaldson, Soviet foreign policy since World War II, 1988.
• E.D. Nolfo, The Atlantic Pact Forty Years Later: A Historical Reappraisal, USA, 1991
• M.D. Shulman, Stalin’s foreign policy reappraised, Harvard University Press, 1963.
• Thomas/McAndrew, Russia/Soviet Union 1917-1945

Encarta 2000 articles on the balance of power, the Cold War, Rio Treaty, NATO, George Washington, Truman, Bevin

• http://www.nato.int/ 28/3/00 Offical NATO website

• http://www.omnibusol.com/wcessay4.html 15/2/00 Essays on Stalin and Eastern Europe:

  • ‘Stalin's Acquisitions: A Little Design, A Lot of Luck’
  • ‘Stalin as Kidnapper; Eastern Europe as Child; the West as Neglectful Parent’
  • ‘Stalin Design, Western Ignorance: A Fatal Mistake Due to Expert Manipulation and Idealism and Ignorance
  • ‘Stalin and the Allies: The Seduction of a Kremlin Leader Gone Wrong’

• http://mars.acnet.wnec.edu/~grempel/courses/stalin/lectures/ColdWar.html 15/2/00

• http://sunsite.unc.edu/expo/soviet.exhibit/coldwar.htm 17/2/00

• http://cwihp.si.edu/default.htm 17/2/00 Cold War international history project

• http://ac.acusd.edu/History/20th/coldwar0.html 17/2/00 University of San Diego Cold War resources

• http://metalab.unc.edu/expo/soviet.exhibit/soviet.archive.html   28/3/00 Soviet primary sources’ museum exhibition