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Did Stalin maintain his hold on power in the years 1945 to 1953?In 1945 Stalin was at the height of his power and prestige, regarded as his country's saviour by millions of Russians. In theory, his grip on power was as strong as it ever had been. Stalin had ‘saved Communism’ from the capitalist invasion he had predicted in 1931. Despite the devastating destruction of the war years the Soviet Union had emerged as a superpower, surpassed only by the United States. Although the victory had been achieved at a momentous cost, Stalin’s reputation increased both at home and abroad. Bullock said the victory in World War Two ‘marked the high point in the relationship between Stalin and the Soviet people’[1]. .The powerful emotions of traditional Russian patriotism, heightened by the losses and the suffering, were focused on the heroic figure of Stalin, who assumed God like status. However, the euphoria of victory and Stalin’s gratitude to the Russian people did not last long. Stalin reacted against the people's hopes that their living standard would now improve, and that ‘the future would be brighter’[2]. Just as he had done eleven years earlier, he declared the population had to reach new heights in order to carry out the next Five Year Plan. It called for amazing increases, for example 500 million tonnes of coal to be produced every year[3]. This decisive action is evidence that after the war Stalin still had a firm grip on power. While this appeared to be a return to the thirties when his control of both military and economic matters was virtually total, Stalin’s hold on power would be weakened in the next eight years before his death in 1953. It is indisputable that as a person Stalin was less capable after 1945 because of the strain that the war had placed upon him. This was the primary factor behind the loosening of his grip on power. He was 65 at the end of the war. Bullock said ‘no man could go through such an experience in his sixties without some loss of vital powers’[4]. Although Stalin remained the head of both the government and the party, his power did not derive from any office. Stalin was simply Stalin, an omnipotent autocrat whose power derived from his persona and not from any legal or institutional base. His authority was unchallenged in any area in which he chose to interject. Stalin’s grip on power had undergone important changes not least because his interest and knowledge of what was going on were more restricted than in the thirties. This was as a result of what had occurred during World War Two. During the war Stalin was consumed by military and diplomatic policy. He left domestic matters such as the economy and war supplies to the members of the State Defence Committee (GOKO). This meant Stalin lost some of his power, which he arguably never recovered. Malenkov and Vozenesensky, rose to prominence through GOKO. Although GOKO was abolished in 1945, they and other members of the Politburo maintained their increased power, exercising a de facto authority as ‘overlords’ for the same range of activities as they had become responsible for in wartime’[5]. For example: Kaganovich for railways and construction, Malenkov for industry, Mikoyan for foreign trade, Voznesenky for planning as Chairman of Gosplan, Beria for the police and Molotov for foreign affairs. They had this authority because as well as membership of the Politburo, they were heads of ministries, deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers and chairmen of the various state committees under the council[6]. The fact that ‘foreign affairs absorbed much of Stalin’s attention after the war’[7] must have increased their power. McNeal said that Stalin played ‘a smaller role in the administration of domestic affairs than he had before he war’[8]. In contrast, as before the war, Stalin kept a ‘tight hand on foreign relations’[9]. His grip on power regarding foreign affairs was just as strong after the war. An example of this was that although Molotov (until 1949), then Vyshinsky, represented the Soviet Union in the Council of Foreign Ministers, neither had license any freedom to depart from his instructions without first consulting Stalin. A reason Stalin was content to leave his deputies with more leeway in domestic policy was because of the rivalry and competition for resources between them. Medvedev said Stalin encouraged ‘mutual hostility between members of the politburo’[10]. They all knew that their ability to win and keep the support of ‘the Boss’ was decisive. None of them trusted any of the rest, alliances were merely temporary and agreement on one issue was compatible with the fierce opposition on another. Stalin was helped by the advantage all saw in informing on each other, a practise he encouraged. An example of this was when he sent Kaganovich to the Ukraine to ‘help’ Kruschev. This balancing of power allowed Stalin to play them off against each other and to re-shuffle the ministers at will. An example of this was in agriculture. Stalin assigned it to Malenkov, replaced him with Andreyev and then gave it to Krushchev- all the time leaving himself free to intervene when he wanted. This example shows that Stalin had decisive power over his deputies. An example of Stalin’s personal intervention which demonstrates the power he maintained after the war was in currency reform. In 1943 Stalin discussed currency reform with Zverev, the Minister of Finance. The gap between the supply of money in the hands of citizens and the goods and services available had considerably widened in wartime. A series of State loan campaigns had failed to eliminate the purchasing power, which Stalin thought threatened the whole economy. Stalin decided to devalue the currency. He thought it should be put forward as a final sacrifice on behalf of the people and a contribution to Russia’s recovery at the end of the war. Zverev was told to write his plan in the greatest secrecy. A year later Stalin introduced Zverev’s draft to the Politburo and in the autumn of 1945 Zverev discussed the plan further at Stalin’s residence. Awaiting the right moment , Stalin meticulously went over every aspect of the new currency, particularly the public presentation of the scheme. It was not until 16th December 1947, four years after he first set Zverev to work, that Stalin finally introduced the change. I think that this dominant, meticulous approach demonstrates that Stalin was still very competent indeed, at least in the first few years after the war. McNeal said that ‘for four or five years after the war Stalin was fit enough to carry a substantial burden of administration’[11] Stalin still had a tight grip on power when he chose to make such ‘sporadic arbitrary interventions’[12] but there is little doubt he was no longer master of the machine he had created. I do not think that the fact that Stalin had ‘effective ultimate authority’[13], the overall power when he wanted it, means his grip on power was as strong as in the thirties. In domestic matters he had lost his grip on power. It is widely accepted Stalin was informed of the debates and decisions concerning industry. However, no evidence exists proving his active involvement in them. This was in stark contrast to his role in the early 1930s, when he was seen as the driving force behind industrialisation. There is also no evidence to show how far the decisions were debated in the politburo itself. It is still unclear how far the crucial battles over policy, investment and allocation took place at the state economic ministries level. If more evidence emerged concerning the economic decision making process, Stalin’s grip on power in the economy could be better determined. An area Stalin maintained a decisive influence after the war was in the bureaucracy. His centralisation of bureaucratic decision-making still existed after the war. Just as Stalin depended on the members of the Politburo for information, they in turn relied upon the middle and bottom tiers of the bureaucracy. All those in the pyramid system had long experience in covering up which led to misinformation at all levels. Stalin maintained his grip over the bureaucracy. Avtorkhanov emphatically claimed that Stalin lost his grip on power. He describes Stalin as ‘virtually powerless by 1952’[14] because Malenkov and Beria had already taken charge. As they controlled the apparatus of the Party and the MVD-MGB, they were able to ignore Stalin and ‘even act contrary to him’ [15]. Avorkhanov alleged that the summary report of the 19th Party Congress was delivered by Malenkov ‘without Stalin’s consent and contrary to his wishes’[16]. He also claims that at the Central Committee Plenum which met after the Congress, Stalin ‘resigned as leader of the Party and it was accepted [17]. Avtorkhanov has been seriously discredited by other Historians. Medvedev dismissed his claims as ‘pure invention’[18]. He claims that in 1952 Stalin had a firm grip on all the main levers of power, and the men around him, including Beria and Malenkov, felt ‘a sense of alarm every time he summoned them because they never knew the meetings outcome’[19]. Deutscher agreed, saying ‘Stalin’s closest lieutenants lived in constant fear of him’[20]. There were no Party Congresses between 1939 and 1952 and the central Committee Plenum met only once between 1945 and 1952. While this does not show that Stalin had lost power compared to before it does show that both Stalin and the Party functioned differently. McNeal also thought this, saying that after the war ‘his authority was somewhat altered’[21]. Deutscher offered another explanation for this chnage, saying Stalin blocked ‘all avenues of change and reform’[22]. Medvedev argued that the ‘riveted’[23] global interest in the USSR, the new superpower became a ‘restraining influence on Stalin’s despotic behaviour’[24]. This is not to say that Stalin’s attitude towards prospective enemies or some nationalities significantly altered but that he was forced to use more ‘clandestine methods’[25] such as assassins. I would disagree with Medvedev, Stalin’s despotic behaviour was not restrained due to the increased attention after 1945 but because of him delegating more and his poor health. An example of Stalin being less informed than in the thirties was in agriculture. This shows he had a weaker grip on power after 1945. His orders often reflected his ignorance to reality in the USSR, particularly in agriculture. In his memoirs Zverev details Stalin’s ‘astonishing lack of information’[26]. Though most villages were poverty-stricken Stalin was convinced that the rural population were actually quite well off. As an example when he proposed a further increase in rural taxes Stalin said ‘a collective farmer only has to sell one chicken and he can keep the Ministry of Finance happy’[27]. The new duties on peasants reduced many to the status of serfs. The period between 1945 and his death in 1953 saw renewed repression and some of Stalin's worst excesses. Returned prisoners of war were incarcerated in concentration camps. His imposition of Communist regimes on Eastern European nations helped create the perilous climate of the cold war. Another example of how his powers waned was that Stalin gave up making speeches. He only made two between 1945 and 1953. He also no longer gave interviews. By his seventieth birthday, Stalin had lost the concentration and energy required to retain his grip over the government machinery. In his last years Stalin ‘rarely spent time in Moscow’[28]. He spent far less time in his office, preferring his dacha at Kuntsevo. He took longer annual holidays, extending them by up to four months. The fact the bureaucracy ran without him shows he had lost his total influence. Stalin was merely sent lists of the proposed decisions to confirm rather than the draft decisions. This clearly shows he had less of a hold on power. Similarly, he only occasionally attended meetings of the Council of Ministers. Stalin’s loss of grip reflected his failing health. Bullock said ‘the unhealthy sedentary life he had lived for so long was catching up on him’. Stalin suffered from high blood pressure, memory lapses and angina attacks[29]. After 1950 the septuagenarian became more aware and frustrated about his old age. Ever the paranoid, he grew more fearful that as his physical and mental powers waned he would be unable to maintain the despotism he had exercised for so long. In the last years of Stalin's life, he even said, ‘I'm finished. I trust no one, not even myself’[30]. Stalin’s increased fear of treachery weakened his grip on power. He feared those like Molotov and Mikoyan who had known him in his prime would notice his decline. He also thought the likes of Malenkov and Beria ,who were twenty years younger, would find out that he was no longer the man he had been and conspire behind his back. Evidence of his fears was the increased protection he received from corps of guards. The ‘inner circle’ of the Politburo had now become a ‘a Mafia with an ageing gang leader’[31]. Stalin’s self-imposed isolation reflected his ‘morbid apprehensions’[32] and his ‘persecution mania’[33]. It is hardly surprising that Boris Godunov was Stalin’s favourite opera[34]. Historians frequently describe Stalin during his final years as irritable and unpredictable. In his final years Stalin turned against many of his closest associates. In January 1953, he arranged the arrest of 9 mainly Jewish professors of medicine in Moscow. They were charged with committing medical assassinations. This ‘plot’[35] Stalin uncovered prompted many to think further arrests and a new wave of terror seemed imminent. Stalin suddenly died on the evening of 28 February, aged 73[36]. It would be very interesting to have seen whether Stalin could have carried out another ‘Great terror’ at the age of 73. If he had been able to then it would have been indisputable proof he had maintained his grip on power. There have been countless theories put forward by such historians such as Avtorkhanov, alleging Stalin was murdered but they seem implausible. Like Hitler, Stalin preserved his self image to the end, without ‘retraction or regret’[37]. He died defying his enemies, ending whatever hope his lieutenants had of putting him aside and taking his place. He never had any intention of abdicating or surrendering. He showed no interest in who succeeded him, immersing himself in his fantasies, shutting out reality beyond the narrow private world he controlled. He was determined to defend his power until his dying day and did so. Medvedev said that Stalin’s ‘suspiciousness increased with the years’[38] which is evidence that he knew his grip on power was loosening. He eventually realised that despite his theoretical position of strength in reality he was detached and un-informed. The strain of the war, the extra emphasis on foreign policy after 1945 and most importantly old age all contributed to the progressive looseing of Stalin’s grip on power between 1945 and 1953, although he still commanded significant power when he intervened. Bibliograph
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