‘New Economic Policy was Lenin’s tacit recognition that the Mensheviks had been right. Discuss.

            1903 saw the second congress of the Russian Social Democrat Party in which Lenin disagreed with Martov over party membership and centralised control of the party. Lenin did not trust the workers with power, attempted to limit membership to active participants in party organisations. Martov desired a more broad-based party. At the congress Lenin dubbed  his faction the bolshinstvo (majority) and  Martov’s  the menshinstvo (minority). These two groups became the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. There were profound disagreements between the two sides. In order to conclude whether by introducing the New Economic Policy the Bolsheviks ‘tacitly’ admitted that the Mensheviks were right the policies of War Communism must be considered alongside the Mensheviks’ criticisms.

             War Communism was a repressive policy, intended to give the government enough control to implement their ‘plan’ of action. The Mensheviks were opposed to such repressive action. They wanted to follow a more evolutionary path than the revolutionary Bolsheviks. For example, they had not wanted to overthrow the government. The Mensheviks were predominately a proletariat party. Unlike the Bolsheviks, they were a true a party of the Proletariat. It is widely accepted the Mensheviks were far closer to Marx’s ideology than the Bolsheviks. The Mensheviks agreed with Marx that a intermediate capitalist revolution was necessary in order to achieve socialism. The Bolsheviks thought they could bypass this stage because Russia was not industrialised and had not fully experienced the capitalism that Marx said was necessary in order for a revolution to occur. The Mensheviks wanted a Parliamentary bourgeoisie run by capitalists which would last a long time because they thought a long run of capitalism was necessary. Thus it was hardly surprising that the greatest Menshevik concern that emerged about Bolshevik policy was War Communism.

            War Communism has been described as a compromise between Lenin and the left.  The left had argued for central direction of the economy and economic planning before Lenin did. It was because of them that the Supreme Council of the National Economy was founded in December 1917. Throughout 1918 the Bolsheviks pushed ahead with rapid nationalisation, placing the entire economy under central guidance and direction. By July, Lenin had decided the workers committees could not be depended on to practice labour discipline and to maintain the level of production required to adequately supply the army. The party increasingly relied upon the ‘Bolshevised’ unions, which they hoped could subject workers to strict state control. The Bolsheviks thought unions should supervise and mobilise labour. The Mensheviks disagreed with this policy, putting forward a return to elections to factory committees, trades unions and soviets. The Mensheviks also disagreed with the mobilisation of millions of people for compulsory labour service. In Autumn 1918, compulsory labour was introduced for those between the ages of 16 and 50 was introduced. The Mensheviks were totally against this restrictive policy.

            In 1918 an extraordinary assembly of delegates from workers and factories in Petrograd was called. It contained many Menshevik who unsurprisingly criticised the government. They emphasised the workers discontent due to starvation, unemployment and factory closure. The Mensheviks said that War Communism had denied people Lenin’s 1917 promise of ‘peace, bread and land’ and ‘All power to the Soviets’ and instead left the people facing food shortages and civil war.

            The Supreme Council of the People's Economy soon ceased to be a council and rapidly evolved into a bureaucratic extension of the state. New organs were established, for example the chief tobacco committee. The Mensheviks described War Communism as a ‘bureaucratisation of society’[1]. They were extremely critical of the great privileges that the Bolshevik officials enjoyed. They also wanted freedom of speech, press, assembly and the release of those socialists arrested by the CHEKA. The Mensheviks  believed in free trade during the capitalist stage of the revolution which would of course, become a key part of the New Economic Policy, as opposed to the state trade monopoly of War Communism,   

The most controversial element of War Communism was grain requisitioning. Early in 1918 food shortages became critical in Petrograd and Moscow. The Bolsheviks tried to meet the 1918 food shortages by forming Poor Peasants Committees which were supposed to lead the poor peasants in revolt against kulaks and lead the transformation of ‘small, individual farms to the socialised working of the land’[2]. These poorly conceived attempts at class warfare were unsuccessful. Even poor peasants were against the collectivisation plans. Sending party officials from towns into the village to requisition food alienated almost the entire peasantry who had no incentive to deliver produce for the towns and army. The peasants naturally felt cheated and they united against their ‘outside enemies’[3], based in Moscow.

            By 1921 it was clear that War Communism had emphatically failed. Russia’s economy lay in ruins after seven years of war and civil war. Industrial production was only 13% of pre-war levels[4]. The grain harvest had fallen from 74 million tons in 1916 to 30 million tons in 1919 and had continued to decline still further[5].  Inflation was rampart, which though the Communists hated and feared it, they had to exacerbate by printing paper money.   No-one had suffered more than the peasants. The 1921 harvest was less than half the pre war average and three million peasants had died from starvation[6]. Widespread peasant uprisings erupted in 1921, most seriously in Tambov, which was not pacified until 1924. The climax of the anti-Communist unrest was the uprising in Kronstadt, near Petrograd in March 1921. It was the ultimate rejection of the government by its former supporters. The Red forces shot down thousands, successfully quelling the revolt. Nevertheless, Lenin realised that Kronstadt was neither an isolated or accidental incident, rather evidence of widespread dissatisfaction. He admitted 'discontent not only among a considerable part of the peasantry but among the workers as well'[7]. Krondstadt demonstrated that unlike the Mensheviks, the Bolsheviks were no longer the party of the working class.

            While many former supporters were revolting, the Bolsheviks also experienced an internal party crisis, due to the failure of  War Communism. Coercion had proven to be ineffective in encouraging peasants to grow more food and distribute more grain. Perhaps the fact that Lenin clung to his policy of War Communism as long he could shows how much he believed in it. Even as late as December 1920, he was urging grain requisitioning to be continued ‘with strict conformity to the decree of the Soviet regime’[8].

            The economic problems led to an increase in support for the Mensheviks and the eventual end of War Communism and the introduction of the New Economic Policy. In a 1919 manifesto the Mensheviks had proposed strikingly similar policies to those of the New Economic Policy. For example, they aimed to retain all political power in the ‘party of the working class’[9] whilst also allowing  private trade and encouraging private enterprise with the aim of regaining peasant support. Was it just coincidence that Lenin waited until the Mensheviks were no longer a threat before he launched the New Economic Policy? It is believed that Lenin may have secretly acknowledged the Mensheviks had been correct. However, he introduced the New Economic Policy as his own idea without openly admitting and stating that the Mensheviks had been right.

            In 1921 the Bolsheviks were ‘forced’ to carry out the radical change in economic policy. At the 10th Party Congress in March 1921, Lenin proposed that the requisitioning of agricultural surpluses, a key aspect of War Communism, should be abandoned in favour of a ‘tax’ set at a fixed percentage of production. Clear evidence that elements of the New Economic Policy had been advocated by the Mensheviks was that only a year earlier Trotsky had proposed just such a measure, but it had been blocked. The enhanced incentives to increase productivity and the prospects of selling goods from a profit meant that the government had reintroduced the freedom of private trade.

            The food tax was intended to revive agricultural production by providing the peasant with the incentive and security previously lacking. However, it seems the political angle to the policy was more important than the economic motive. Lenin called the new tax 'pre-eminently a political question' [10].  He said in his speech at the 10th Party Congress  that ‘only agreement with the peasantry can save the socialist revolution in Russia’[11]. He made it clear the peasantry had to appeased and could not be ‘driven out as we drove out and annihilated the landowners and the capitalists’[12]. This direct contradiction of War Communism is reminiscent of the Menshevik’s arguments in 1919.

            The New Economic Policy was a non-doctrinaire, political compromise with the peasantry. Riazanov called the New Economic Policy ‘the peasant Brest’, a truce concluded with the peasant, rather than Germany as the enemy. Zinoviev said the New Economic Policy was ‘only a temporary deviation, a tactical retreat, a clearing of land for a new and decisive attack of labour against the front of international capitalism’[13]. The fact that the New Economic Policy was described as only temporary perhaps demonstrates it was a grudgingly pragmatic step, that the Bolsheviks did not fully believe in, forced on them after their preferred  War Communism had failed. They deployed the New Economic Policy to regain the favour of the people, rather than because of any ideological change. Lenin said in October 1921 that ‘Our New Economic Policy means that in applying our former methods we suffered defeat and had to begin a strategic retreat’ [14]. Lenin’s admission that ‘if the peasants could not be forced they must be persuaded’ [15] into growing more produce  is perhaps further evidence of a tacit recognition the Mensheviks had been right.

            Though the motive behind the food tax was predominately political, it initiated an economic revival. After the peasants had paid the ‘tax’, they could put the rest of their produce on the free market. In 1921 the tax was fixed at 10%. A year later the peasants were allowed to lease and hire labour, although dealing in land was not allowed. The Fundamental Law on the Exploitation of Land by the Workers of May 1922,  guaranteed peasants freedom of choice of land tenure. These measures granted the peasants the economic freedom necessary to revive the squashed economy.

            Under the New Economic Policy small businesses were permitted greater economic freedom. Once again this was a Menshevik policy and its introduction was perhaps evidence that Lenin was tacitly admitting the Mensheviks had been right. Although, the state kept control of the 'commanding heights' like the banks and railways, entrepreneurs were allowed to hire labour, and trade virtually freely with the goods produced. State industries and farms were expected now to function profitably s to ‘operate on commercial principles’[16], a policy the Mensheviks had advocated. Most aspects of the New Economic Policy were extremely similar to the policies the Mensheviks had advocated.  The New Economic Policy resulted in the industrial goods falling in price and agricultural produce rising, preventing a situation like War Communism appearing again.

            Under the New Economic Policy, economic normality was gradually restored. By 1923 the regime was managing to stabilise itself.  Evidence of this is can be seen from the tax revenues, which reflected the economic growth. In December 1923, 1/3 of government revenue came from the food tax, 1/3 from direct money taxes, and 1/3 from the issuance of new bank notes[17]. The growing tax yield meant that a new currency could be adopted in 1924. The open encouragement given to private enterprise left many inside and outside Russia concluding capitalism had returned for good, and that the Communists had jettisoned their ideology. The introduction of the New Economic Policy was not the first time foreign observers decided that Communist doctrine was becoming less important.

            By introducing the New Economic Policy Lenin had decided that a serious retreat from Communist objectives, albeit a conditional and temporary one was essential if the government  was to be safe from a revolt by former supporters. However, there is considerable debate as to whether Lenin conceived the New Economic Policy as merely temporary and conditional. It is commonly accepted he did not want the New Economic Policy to last as long as the Mensheviks envisioned the Capitalist stage of the revolution, which perhaps shows that he did not think the Mensheviks were right. However, Ulam argues that the New Economic Policy was conceived seriously as a ‘long run policy’[18]. Some Historians see the New Economic Policy as a ‘golden age’ which could have offered  a viable path to socialism. They claim that Lenin had decided to stick with the NEP in his last years. Nevertheless, I think Lenin conceived the New Economic Policy as a short term policy.

            The New Economic Policy caused great division in the Bolshevik Party, sparking great anger among the left, who had preferred War Communism and viewed the New Economic Policy as a fundamental betrayal of the Bolshevik ideology and a counter revolution. They thought it was incompatible with socialism. It is important that War Communism could have been a response to emergency conditions, rather than an ideological policy. However, it is significant that Lenin never said War Communism was temporary at the time. It is also important to remember that there was extreme economic devastation at the time of War Communism when considering whether the change to New Economic Policy, which contained Mensheviks ideas, was a tacit admittance by Lenin that the Mensheviks had indeed been right. However, it is accepted that the Bolsheviks saw War Communism as an ideology (rather than as a response to emrgency consitions) and they had tried to reach utopia through policies like the Veshenka, nationalisation and requisitioning. McAndrew said ‘only after the measures had failed and changes had to be made did the Bolsheviks claim that War Communism had been a response to circumstances’[19]

             Such vast, ‘social experimentation’[20] proved disastrous. Lenin’s steps towards total communism have been described as messy and disorderly. However, the introduction of the New Economic Policy as the Bolsheviks own idea shows they only ‘tacitly’ admitted the superiority of the Mensheviks arguments and their mistakes. The fact that so many prominent Bolsheviks criticised Lenin for ‘retreating’ shows the suitability and appropriateness of the word tacit. The Bolsheviks had introduced War Communism as a long term idealistic dream rather than a pragmatic measure and the New Economic Policy was a tacit admission of its failure. Lenin was too proud a man to openly admit his mistakes and he would never openly acknowledge the Mensheviks had been right and that he had been wrong.

Bibliography

• Action, E, Russia, The Present And The Past, Longman, 1990, Singapore

• Hosking, G., A History of the Soviet Union, Fontana, 1985, London

• McCauley, M. The Soviet Union since 1917, Longman, 1981, Hong Kong

• Morris, TA. European History 1848-1945

• Rice C., Lenin, Cassel, London, 1990

• Siegelbaum, L, Soviet State and Society between Revolution, 1918-1929

• Thomas/McAndrew, Russia/Soviet Union 1917-1945, Hodder, 1995, Australia

• Ulam, A.B., Lenin and the Bolsheviks, Collins, 1965, Glasgow  

• http://www.ozemail.com.au/~johnkent/history/nep.html

• Professor Gerhard Rempel, Western New England College:

  • http://mars.acnet.wnec.edu/~grempel/courses/stalin/lectures/New Economic Policy.html

  • http://mars.acnet.wnec.edu/~grempel/courses/stalin/lectures/WarCom.html