What were Stalin’s objectives in Europe, 1941-1949?

By 1945 the pre-1939 status quo among the Great powers had disappeared beyond recall. France, Germany and Western Europe lay in ruins, with the USSR controlling the devastated lands of Eastern and Central Europe. Stalin would play a central role in reshaping the post-world war world. There has always been controversy surrounding his aims for Europe in the 1940s. The Communist seizure of power in Russia in 1917, and the creation of the Soviet Union, had always been regarded with great hostility by the capitalist West who ideologically opposed Communism. British, American, German, Japanese and other forces had all intervened against the Red forces in the Civil War, 1918-21. America refused to recognize the Soviet Union until 1933. Stalin had aimed to avoid fighting in World War Two. He first hoped the western powers would destroy each other to the obvious benefit of the USSR. However, after Operation Barbarosa, the Nazi invasion of Russia, the USSR entered an alliance with the USA and Great Britain against the Axis powers. It was inevitable that the latent mistrust would remerge after Hitler was defeated in 1945.

Even in 1942, during the alliance there was great mutual suspicion between the USSR and the West. McCauley said ‘neither side completely trusted the other to fight Germany to a finish’[1]. Stalin had always suspected that Britain and France were seeking to forment conflict between Germany and Russia. He feared that the western allies might conclude a separate peace with Berlin, thus freeing Germany to pit all its strength against the Soviet Union. After the disastrous Nazi Soviet Pact, Stalin never extended to his British and American allies the ‘same good faith he had mistakably perceived in Hitler’[2]. Gaddis said: In the Grand Alliance Stalin ‘remained a distant and by no means trusting third party’[3]. In 1943 Stalin thought that the West would not accept outright his primary post war aim of a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe against imperialist aggression. Therefore he aimed to achieve this by the power of intervention given by Russian occupation, combined with verbal reassurances to the West such as his promise to consult ‘the democratic, anti-Nazi forces’[4]. Stalin calculated that, provided the process was ‘gradual and piecemeal’[5], the Western powers would protest but accept the situation as a  fait accompli.

With Germany defeated, the Grand Alliance of 1941-5 had served its purpose. The red flag atop the Reichstag in May 1945 symbolised the Soviet Union becoming a superpower. In 1945 the borders of the Soviet Union were secure. The Kremlin had secured an ice-free port and the Baltics, had taken Poland and subdued Germany. There was considerable satisfaction at Soviet gains. The political triumph gave Stalin an enhanced reputation. In 1945 he reached the height of his power and prestige, despite the catastrophe of having trusted Hitler in 1941. Both Roosevelt and Churchill recognized the reality of Soviet power in 1945[6]. Power over Europe had shifted to the USSR and the USA. However, Hitler’s suicide had removed the most important factor holding the allies together. Nogee called the alliance ‘only a marriage of convenience, marred on both sides by continuing suspicion, misperception and deception’[7].

The incompatibilities between the powers visions of post-war Europe were vividly apparent. Nogee said there was no ‘shared vision of the post-war order among the Big Three’[8]. The West wanted freedom, self-determination and democracy. Stalin’s main objective in Europe was undoubtedly security from the West, meaning additional territory, which would make Russia harder to invade. Gaddis thought ‘Stalin could not forget the past in preparing for the future’[9]. Three devastating invasions in just 130 years had convinced him to seek ‘security through territorial acquisitions and spheres of influence’[10]. Thomas said ‘Soviet foreign policy was determined by the desire to protect the revolution from external enemies’[11].  Stalin’s main aim had been long-held in Imperial Russia: to secure western borders with ‘ideologically friendly regimes’[12], and permanently solve the German issue through occupation. Stalin was ‘determined to prevent yet another devastating assault on the USSR from the West’[13]. To achieve this Stalin planned to use simple, yet undetected manipulation, even intimidation, to exert Soviet power and influence over Eastern Europe. Daishwa said that ‘following WW2, the most important goal of Soviet foreign policy was the establishment and maintenance of its position in Eastern Europe’[14]. Stalin was prepared to ‘forgo any other objective in international affairs in order to secure and promote its influence over almost all aspects of life in those countries’[15]. Poland was seen as the key because it was the main invasion route to Russia. The Poles had also been historically against Russia. Bullock said that ‘Poland was the touchstone’[16] for Stalin. Solving the German question was a fundamental aim for Stalin. It should be remembered that Stalin was guided by a 'view of history that postulated the inevitability of a hostile international environment as long as capitalist states existed’[17]. He was still worried Germany might invade Russia. Stalin believed Germany would recover and generate yet another world war. Stalin's aims for post-war Germany were to ‘occupy, demilitarise, and dismember...abolish its officer corps, and force the payment of reparations’[18].

Stalin participated in the Allies' meetings at Tehrân (1943), Yalta (1945), and Potsdam (1945) to decide the overall military and political strategy of the war as well as a common post-war European policy. Stalin was ‘quick to comprehend that the attainment of his goals…relied heavily upon compliance with Allies[19]. The Soviet leadership believed that it deserved whatever gains material or territorial, it had fought so hard and suffered so terribly to achieve. Stalin was preoccupied with restoring the Soviet economy after the damage inflicted on it by the Germans. He aimed to achieve a reparations scheme that would have given the Soviets ‘the lion’s share of the economic spoils from all of Germany’[20]. Their ambitious demands were rejected by the United States and Britain who opposed the establishment of a vast Soviet sphere of power. Despite the ‘growing acrimony’[21] between the Allies, agreement was reached at Potsdam on the general lines of the occupation policy, on various reparations policies, which were extremely important to Stalin, and on temporary boundaries.

The USSR utilised the threat of its military force to violate the Declaration of Liberated Europe and other wartime agreements to achieve Stalin’s aims of increased territorial protection.  Someone said ‘no sooner had the ink dried on the Yalta agreements than Stalin began moving to consolidate the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe’[22].

By the end of 1946, Stalin could be well content with the results of Soviet persistence. All the East European governments had been recognised, and the territorial settlement agreed by the Peace Conference for the most part followed those already put into effect by the Russians. Stalin had attained the recognition of a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. As expected, Communist domination was extended over most of the countries ‘liberated’ by the Soviet armies. Communism had spread to a system that held over 100 million additional people in 11 more European states: Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania. One can only speculate whether these territorial acquisitions were Stalin’s exact plans. Nogee believed ‘there was no single tactical blueprint for Soviet domination of Eastern Europe’[23]. In 1946 Stalin seemingly achieved his post-war aim of the ‘shield for Communism[24]’- territorial security against future western aggression.

The two main versions of the origins of the Cold War contain what Kennedy-Pipe calls ‘two diametrically opposed interpretations of Stalin’s behaviour’[25] and hence two different versions of his aims. One portrays Stalin masterminding the subjugation of Europe and gloating at the inability of the Western allies to deter him in his power-crazed bid for expansion. For example, many scholars think Stalin aimed to get a hold in the Near East and the Mediterranean[26].  The other version has an intimidated dictator, the worse for drink, petrified of imminent attack and driven into Eastern Europe in a desperate bid to protect Soviet wartime gains. As John Lewis Gaddis says ‘we know now’, after the Cold War has ended that neither account is right: the Soviet leadership under Stalin flexibly pursued a mix of ambitions. Stalin obviously had expansionist aims that necessitated the control of Eastern Europe. This control of East and Central Europe was the sine qua non of the post war settlement for Stalin[27]. The second agenda was to pursue co-operation with the Western Allies and to gain the economic and technological assistance needed for the reconstruction of the USSR from America. Behind this ostensibly pragmatic aim were complex calculations by the Soviet leadership, dominated by the belief that all the major powers had an interest in prolonged peace, mutual trading associations and the requirement for the emasculation of Germany. The Soviet leadership ‘pursued both agendas’[28] until the announcement of the Marshal Aid programme in 1947.

The fact the USSR always felt inferior to the USA is of crucial importance in Stalin’s aims and in the origins of the Cold War. To hide the weakness it was necessary to give the impression the country was strong, to avoid ‘losing face’ to the West at all costs. This aim reflects the ‘morbid apprehensions[29]’ of Stalin’s mentally unstable, suspicious, paranoid, power hungry personality. Khrushchev called him a ‘very distrustful man, sickly suspicious, seeing enemies everywhere’[30]. Khrushchev said he ‘jealously guarded foreign policy’[31], reflecting his paranoia. The slightest threat of  opposition put Stalin on the warpath, determined to suppress it. The ‘violence of the verbal polemics (with the USA) testified to Moscow’s nervousness’[32]. However, as Sigmund Freund said ‘even paranoids can have real enemies’[33]. Since the USSR had so often found herself ranged against the West, it found no difficulty in believing that the Western powers were in collusion against her.  Stalin’s ‘concentration on reparations’[34] from Germany as one of his main aims, illustrated the weakness of the Soviet economy. He feared that western technology, capital, ideas, culture and political values would penetrate the Soviet Union, loosening up the rigid hierarchical structure fundamental to Stalinism.  These fears were perhaps the reason he aimed to isolate the USSR from the west.  

Rumours had been rife in Russia during the war that ‘things were going to be better after victory’[35], which implied the Stalinist system was to be modified. For example, during the war, Joseph E. Davies, an American, wrote that ‘the Russians intended to cooperate with, and not to stir up trouble for their neighbours, with whom they are pledged to collaborate to win the war and the peace’[36]. In December 1941 Litvinov called upon Stalin to declare an open allegiance to the idea of a permanent Great-Power alliance with the British and Americans. However, such things were always far from his mind. Stalin never aimed to reform the Stalinist system on western lines. In 1945, he aimed to recreate the atmosphere of the late 1930s. Stalin said in 1946 that the victory had ‘demonstrated the vitality of the Soviet social system and of the soviet state’[37] and stated there would be three more Five Year Plans. It is fundamental to remember that the key to everything Stalin did after 1928, including his post-war aims for Europe, was to maintain his position of supreme power in the USSR.

The West, greatly concerned over Soviet threats against Iran and Turkey, interpreted a 1946 speech by Stalin as declaring ideological war against the West. Stalin claimed ‘the war was the inevitable result of the development of world economic and political forces on the basis of modern monopoly capitalism’[38]. He believed that the Americans and the British imperialism would clash and eventually socialism would triumph. Yerofeyev said the speech was ‘interpreted in the West as no less than a prediction of WWIII’[39], although Yerofeyev believed Stalin did not say ‘anything new or different from what he had always believed: that with imperialism and capitalism, war was inevitable’[40].  Britain and America concluded the Soviets should no longer have any freedom to manipulate the ‘idealism and ignorant hope of the Western Powers’[41], as they had to kidnap Eastern Europe. The allies had wrongly interpreted Stalin’s aims. They had been taken in by Stalin’s façade that Russia had ‘seen the light’[42] out of communism and was ready to join them in an effort to sustain world peace. The Allies realised they had ‘made a terrible mistake in thinking that Stalin had changed, that his ideas of expansion had disintegrated’[43]. As the cooperation between Soviet and Western powers declined, their relationship inevitably turned into one of competition and rivalry. The American President Truman opposed Stalin’s policies and moved to unite Europe under American leadership. Mistrust grew as Stalin held ‘Blatantly fixed’[44] elections to install Communist governments throughout Eastern Europe and Truman refused to send German reparations to the Soviet Union.

By 1947 the West perceived the USSR to be an unashamedly expansionist, military power. The West would not fight them by force but limit them by every means possible – containment. By 1948 in the ‘atmosphere of heightened international tension’[45], America launched the $13-billion European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan) to rebuild Western and Central Europe[46]. Stalin’s decision to reject participation in the Marshall Plan is widely regarded by historians as a turning point in the development of the Cold War, and hence his aims. Involvement in the Marshall Plan, appeared to be ‘in tune with Soviet Objectives of co-operation with the USA’[47] in trade to rehabilitate the Soviet and East European economies. However, once Stalin realized it was aimed against Communism he responded by accepting the division of Europe and increasing control over the East European Communist parties. Stalin showed how crucial his desire to preserve the Moscow line was when he ‘threatened the Czech leaders to prevent them from accepting Marshall Aid’[48].

Stalin’s aims in 1948 were still generally the same as in 1945: to protect the USSR from foreign invasion and eliminate the possibility of any internal opposition, though the nature of the Cold War as a propaganda and diplomatic conflict led Stalin to do anything to outdo America. He aimed to demonstrate the strength of the Soviet Union by increasing tensions with the West, a confrontational foreign policy. An example of this could be seen in 1948 when the USSR blockaded the western sectors of Berlin, which had been under joint Allied administration since 1945. Someone said the Berlin Blockade (1948-1949), which led to a massive Western airlift of vital supplies for the beleaguered sectors of the city, ‘was done to increase tensions’[49]. Shulman said the blockade was carried out as a ‘counterthrust to currency reform in West Berlin’[50]. After the blockade Stalin accepted that the line across Europe would be drawn ‘no farther Westward than the middle of Germany’[51]. Stalin aims in 1949 were to consolidate what he had achieved up until that point. In 1949 the Western powers felt so threatened by Stalin’s aims, that they formed a military alliance - the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) - to secure Europe against further Soviet encroachment[52].

There is an ongoing debate among Historians as to whether Stalin’s aims in Europe between 1941-9 were ‘manifestly in excess of the needs of its national security’[53].  I do not think Stalin aimed to spread Communism further than Eastern Europe, just territorial security. Shulman said that Soviet foreign policy was ‘largely rational’[54]. Stalin was justified in being suspicious of the West. The USA, ‘barely touched by the ravages of war’[55] had emerged as the dominant global power, rich in human skills and natural resources. Stalin was frightened they were trying to destroy Communism and impose capitalism on them. It is important to remember than in many ways the USSR had been greatly weakened by the war, for example it had lost one eighth of the population[56] and 13.6 million soldiers[57]. The military campaigns in the Soviet Union ‘devastated 1,710 cities and settlements, 70,000 towns and villages, and over 6 million buildings of all kinds[58]'. Wood judged the USSR’s victory Piric[59]. Unsurprisingly, in 1945 ‘the economic and technological backwardness of the USSR was becoming increasingly apparent’[60]. I think the USSR was a more defensive power, with Stalin’s aims more consolatory than those who thought Stalin used ‘the pretext of seeking Soviet security’[61] to ‘extend Communist domination worldwide’[62] now the European balance of power that ‘had held him in check had been destroyed’. This can be disproved by the fact that in 1947 Stalin ignored a Greek Communist uprising and left Britain to deal with it. Gaddis was correct to write, ‘Washington fabricated the myth of a hostile Soviet Union’[63]. From 1945 Stalin stayed on the defensive, inclined to seek a measure of co-operation with the West but incapable of finding the necessary mechanisms to do so[64]. At no stage did Stalin ever envision spreading communism to Western Europe and America.  The aim of World Revolution, which had certainly existed among the likes of Trotsky, was long gone by 1941. Davies said that Stalin’s accession to supreme power in 1928 marked ‘the final abandonment of the notion of fostering world revolution as the prime aim of Soviet foreign policy’[65]. Grempel said ‘Soviet policy was becoming increasingly concerned with power-block politics and less with the revolutionary awakening of the world proletariat’[66]. Evidence that Stalin did not expect (and obviously he did not want) conflict with the West in was that the armed forces were reduced from a wartime peak of 11 million to 2.8 million in 1948. He did not expect an aggressive military challenge for the West and he certainly was not aiming for one. However, never one to take undue risks Stalin sought to deter America from deploying its military forces (while making it possible for the USSR to probe for opportunities to expand its influence) through military and political measures.

  Whilst there is little doubt that the implementation of Soviet foreign policy generated the Cold War, a ‘globe girdling’[67] political, diplomatic, and economic conflict with the West, this does not mean Stalin wanted a conflict. I have shown Stalin’s aims changed in the period 1941-9. In 1941 perhaps Stalin just wanted the USSR to survive the Nazis invasion. Many Historians think Stalin fluctuated between minimum and maximum aims, with some believing the maximum aim to be global Communism. The reality was something between the two; Stalin never aimed to directly confront the West and it is fair to state he never aimed only for Eastern Europe. Stalin himself always feared capitalist encirclement but also believed in spreading the communist ideology. In the forties, Russian behaviour, and Stalin’s aims, as George Kennan saw, were governed by the perception ‘not of strength but of weakness and fear for the future’[68]. Stalin followed an imperial model of expansion, his behaviour motivated by insecurity and caution. However, he was also incapable of defining the limits of security requirements. This led to him seeking ‘to fill power vacuums’[69] in areas where it would not encounter resistance. These aims resulted in Stalin achieving the Soviet sphere of influence he craved but alarmed, and ultimately alienated the West, who ‘saw Stalin’s inability to define the full extent of his security requirements (and hence his aims) as undermining their own’[70]. Stalin’s exact goals remain controversial[71].

Bibliography

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• P.G. Lewis, Central Europe since 1945, Longman, London, 1994.
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• M.McCauley, Stalin and Stalinism, Longman, London, 1995.
• R. McNeal, Stalin: Man and Ruler, 1988, Hong Kong
• Morris, TA. European History 1848-1945.
• J.L. Nogee and R.H. Donaldson, Soviet foreign policy since World War II, Pergamon, 1988, Exeter.
• M.D. Shulman, Stalin’s foreign policy reappraised, Harvard University Press, 1963.
• Thomas/McAndrew. Russia/Soviet Union 1917-1945

• http://mars.acnet.wnec.edu/~grempel/courses/stalin/lectures/ColdWar.html 15/2/00 Professor Gerhard Rempel

• http://sunsite.unc.edu/expo/soviet.exhibit/coldwar.htm 17/2/00 US library of congress archives

• http://cwihp.si.edu/default.htm 17/2/00 Cold War international history project

• http://ac.acusd.edu/History/20th/coldwar0.html 17/2/00 University of San Diego CW resources

• http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Acropolis/7477/stalin.htm 7/12/99

• http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/bomb/peopleevents/pandeAMEX69.html 7/12/99

• http://turnerlearning.com/cnn/coldwar/iron/iron_eye.html#eye3 17/2/00

• http://cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/kbank/profiles/stalin/ 17/2/00

• http://metalab.unc.edu/expo/soviet.exhibit/soviet.archive.html 17/2/00

• http://ac.acusd.edu/History/20th/coldwar0.html 17/2/00

• http://mars.acnet.wnec.edu/~grempel/courses/stalin/lectures/ColdWar.html 15/2/0
• http://www.omnibusol.com/wcessay4.html 15/2/00 Essays on Stalin and Eastern Europe: 

  • ‘Stalin's Acquisitions: A Little Design, A Lot of Luck’

  • ‘Stalin as Kidnapper; Eastern Europe as Child; the West as Neglectful Parent’

  • ‘Stalin Design, Western Ignorance: A Fatal Mistake Due to Expert Manipulation and Idealism and Ignorance’

  • ‘Stalin and the Allies: The Seduction of a Kremlin Leader Gone Wrong’

Encarta 2000 CD-ROM articles on Soviet Union, USA, Cold War, Marshall Plan, Stalin, World War Two, Containment, National Security, geopolitics, East-West conflict