Russia Essay 5

Before undertaking an evaluation of Stalin's role in advancing the Russian economy an analysis of that progress, and its cost, is required. Undoubtedly Russia was in a dire economic situation in 1928. Although a predominately agricultural nation, it was unable to feed its people, relying on archaic methods. Industry was small scale. Russia was the lone Communist state, hated by the capitalist West. Whilst afraid of the threat of western invasion Stalin wanted to spread his Communist philosophy to other countries. There was a need to prove Communism could lead to a successful economy. He knew that a thriving and strong state could not be bullied by the West and would improve the chances of spreading communism. Stalin famously said in 1931:

...We are fifty to a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this lag in ten years. Either we do it or they crush us.¹

The speech was intended as a warning that if Russia did not change from a underdeveloped, agrarian country into an advanced, industrial power extremely quickly it would be overtaken by the capitalists who feared the spread of communism and wished to destroy it. Stalin's fears were well grounded because it was well known the West wanted to smash communism. Stalin, and his people, were united in thinking Socialist society could only succeed if industry was quickly modernised and expanded.

From an under-developed state in 1928 Russia was able to modernise to become an industrial giant. By 1940 it had overtaken Britain and France, had caught up with Germany and was beginning to catch up with the USA and proved largely immune to the 1929 Economic Crisis, because it had little trade with the West. This demonstrated the economy's strength. In 1930 78% of all machine tools were imported but in 1937 this figure was reduced to less than 10%² ,a huge improvement. When the USSR was invaded by the Nazis in 1941 it was self-sufficient, possessing a large-scale iron and steel industry, automobile plants, a chemical industry, electrical power stations and engineering works. It mined all its own coal, drilled and refined all its own oil. The mechanisation of transport was far advanced and the USSR had the most mechanised farming system in Europe. Without these tremendous industrial advances it would probably not have survived the War with Nazi Germany.

It has been said that the years 1928-35 were even more decisive in changing the course of Russian history than 1917-21. It has been called a Second Revolution. Stalin used his totalitarian powers to shape the economy in his own image. Agriculture desperately needed urgent modernisation. A rise in productivity was required to support the increased number of industrial workers and build up a food reserve to cope with the problems of war and famine. Improved grain productivity was a prerequisite to pay for imported agricultural and capital goods for industrial development. On this there was widespread agreement. However, there were serious differences of opinion over three key decisions. Firstly, how the increased production would be achieved. Secondly, whether the peasants should be persuaded or forced to achieve this gain and thirdly, how long it would take to produce the desired results.

Throughout the 1920s Stalin had been content to subscribe to the view that the modernisation must be carried out 'gradually, steadily eschewing forcible methods, through demonstration and persuasion³.' He said this as late as December 1927. Stalin agreed with Bukharin and the Right's view i.e., consolidation of the smaller strips of land and convincing the peasants to move to co-operative action and modern methods. They wanted to let the economy develop at its own pace without government intervention. Bukharin believed modernisation would be a gradual process, taking up to twenty years. However, at some stage, believed to be early 1928, Stalin changed his views. He decided to revive the extreme policy of Lenin's War Communism of 1917 as an attempt to 'short-cut'³ Russia to modernisation, characteristically using bullying tactics to get his way. The rationale behind this was that Russia had to modernise quickly, to preserve the Communist State. This U-turn by Stalin was described by Lynch as 'standing Marxist theory on its head.'⁴ Stalin had decided to make the political system determine the character of the economy. McAndrew said Stalin claimed that economic prosperity rested on 'confronting and eliminating the peasantry'⁵.

Bukharin, the foremost member of the Communist right in the late 1920s, differed from Stalin. In contrast to Stalin, he wanted to encourage peasant prosperity and to continue and update the New Economic Policy. Moderate Bukharinism is seen by many as having been a viable alternative to the hard lines of Stalinism. Bukharin thought his policies would keep the backing of the peasants as well as the smychka, the bond between the town and countryside. He wanted to develop rural co-operatives and give time for the peasant majority and the private sector to steadily 'grow into socialism'⁶ through links with the Socialist sector. Bukharin's gradual proposals developed the themes of Lenin's later writings of the early 1920s, with their elaboration of the NEP as a road to socialism, and at the same time voiced the search for 'socialism with a human face'⁷ which the Czechs echoed in 1967. Historians disagree over Bukharinism. Bullock wrote that it was not a 'manageable alternative in a desperate Russia'⁹, thinking that as Stalin had said they needed to industrialise very quickly or they would be crushed. However, it is commonly accepted that Bukharin's policies were more suitable to Russia than Stalin's. It is thought 'Bukharin was defeated not with arguments but with party cards.'⁹.Perhaps if Bukharin had been more politically adept, Stalin would have stuck with his ideas. McCauley claims that a reason that Bukharin's ideas were dropped by Stalin was that despite being a renowned economist he never produced 'a convincing economic plan to counter the dreams of the super industrialisers'⁸ like Stalin, who was eventually able to over rule the views of Bukharin, and remove him as a key figure.

There was no-one left who could get a moderate policy adopted now that Bukharin had gone. Stalin had an unobstructed path. The principal men in the Central Committee were closely associated with him and backed his views in 1929. They saw Stalinism as the only workable route to establish an industrial super-state. However, the debate surrounding Bukharin did continue because his views were perhaps the only viable alternative to Stalin's. He was the only other key figure economic decision making in the USSR.

There had always been huge problems in agriculture in 1928. The countryside had been overpopulated for centuries, creating a chronic land shortage, although there were also vast, inhospitable areas. There was a lack of production because of old fashioned methods, like strip farming. When collectivisation (combining many small farms into large collectives) was introduced in 1928 it was described as 'voluntary¹⁰.' Stalin claimed it was a free choice but it was enforced on a very reluctant peasantry, who were the most conservative class in Russia. 25 million peasant holdings would be turned into 240,000 collectives¹⁰ within 24 months. These policies would dramatically affect the lives of 120 million people. Lynch claimed Stalin, having ignored the right and Bukharin, had now 'adopted the ideas of the extreme left¹⁰.' A significant point regarding the agricultural change is that more than 50% of the peasantry was illiterate² and therefore impervious to printed propaganda or written technical advice. This made it difficult for them to understand the economic decisions being made.

In June 1929 Stalin ended Lenin's New Economic Policy because he thought it was hindering industry and because all food was rationed under it. The first Motor Tractor Stations were organised. It was hoped that these stations would, through technology, improve the low productivity. However, they failed because they could not get the parts for the foreign built tractors when they broke down. A large rural-to-urban migration was instituted to provide workers for new factories in the rapidly growing cities. This had huge repercussions on the Russian people, who were being forced to fundamentally change their way of life to serve the industrial advancement..

Stalin and the Communist Party resented the dependence of Russia on the peasant population, which comprised 80% of the population¹¹ but had no place in the Marxist schema. In 1928 only 14.5% of the party came from the peasantry². The peasantry were seen as 'a vast, inert and yet somehow threatening mass of people'¹² ,who needed to be conquered. In 1929-30 it became clear Stalin wanted a lasting solution to the social and economic problems the rural sector gave him. He decided to eliminate the wealthier peasants, the Kulaks, who had benefited from the NEP. Stalin declared class warfare against the Kulaks. The awful retaliatory measures were mercilessly carried out against them. Stalin dubbed the Kulaks exploiters who needed liquidating. This was an example of how Stalin invented the truth. The Kulaks did not need to be eliminated because they were not a threat. It would surely have been better economic policy to keep the Kulaks on his side, because they were good producers. The economy would have advanced more if he had done this. This is an example of how Stalin used his power to wipe out 'dangerous' groups like the Kulaks who in fact were not dangerous at all. Stalin thought that if you tell a big enough lie, people are more likely to behave as if there is some truth in it. It shows how he adversely affected the industrial development. Dekulakisation began in July 1930. It led to mass suffering. As a protest the Kulaks slaughtered their cattle. The waste resulting from his agricultural policies is one of Stalin's most significant failings. The culls were a blow that Soviet agriculture did not recover from for 25 years as is shown in Figure 2 (Statistics on collectivisation from a Soviet source).

Agriculture suffered heavily under Stalin. None of the figures for grain harvested, cattle, pigs and sheep and goats are much higher in 1935 than they were in 1928. There were 146.7 million sheep and goats in 1928 but only 61.1 million in 1935.¹³ The average crop for 1928-30 was 74 million tonnes, this fell to 67 million tonnes for 1931-5. It recovered with an exceptional crop of 87 million tonnes in 1937 and fell back again to 67 million tonnes in 1938 and 1939. Far from making progress these figures show a worsening agricultural return. However, by the end of 1934, 90% of the cultivated land of the USSR was under collectivisation. See Figure 1 (Percentage of household collectivisation 1928-36). In 1928 only 1.7% of households were collectivised but by 1936 this had risen dramatically to 90.5%². Grain production had risen throughout the twenties but began to fall after 1928. Only the fact that the state succeed in almost doubling the percentage of the crop taken (from an average of 18 million tones in 1928-32 to 32.1 million in 1938-40)¹⁴ avoided a recurrence of famine for the increasing population.

	Million head
	1928	1933
Cattle	70.5	38.4
Pigs	26	12.1
Sheep and goats	146.7	50.2

These above figures show that cattle and pigs halved between 1928 and 1935 and there were only a third as many sheep and goats in 1933 as in 1928. The economic results of collectivisation can at best be described as unimpressive. McCauley said that the agricultural performance was 'abysmal'¹⁵. Stalin was responsible for this policy and hence this failure.

It was not until after Stalin's death in 1953 that the losses were made good¹⁶. Several years of potential progress had been wasted. After Stalin's collectivisation Russian agriculture remained the weakest part of the Russian economy for the rest of the twentieth century. When the appalling suffering of millions is taken into account then collectivisation can only be described as a spectacular failure. Stalin played an entirely negative role in agriculture, failing to understand both the nature of the problems and how to use the strengths of the existing system. Agricultural practise in Russia was based upon centuries of tradition. It needed to change, to be more successful in order to support the industrial development. but the whole economy still remained dependant on the peasants, who were not offered any incentive to produce more. They were worse off than they had been before the emancipation of 1861. It is estimated that at least fifteen million people were left 'without shelter or any future'¹⁷ and that seven million people died in the famine 1932-33. The agricultural policies have been described as 'a war against the peasantry'¹⁷. Thomas wrote that the Russian people were 'victims of a system in which the use of force and the insistence on discipline were paramount'¹⁸. This shows what a failure the agricultural reform was, from the peasants point of view. Stalin falsely claimed that the peasants were the aggressors, seeking to hinder and act against the state and he justified his role in their suffering by saying he needed to crush them as a group in order to modernise Russia to 20^th century standards.

It would be hard to think of a worse agricultural policy than forced collectivisation, which drove the most energetic, useful and experienced farmers off the land in pursuit of the chimera of rural capitalism and soon developed into a full blown war of the state against the peasants, four fifths of the Russian population. It is interesting that Stalin told Churchill it had been as hard a war as against the Nazis and cost 10 million lives.¹⁴ This shows his attitude towards the peasants was confrontational. As well as being forever weakened the peasants were now forever alienated. They took their revenge by co-operating with the state as little as possible. This forced the state and the party, who knew very little about agriculture and Stalin's idea of large scale mechanisation, to intervene more frequency with predictably negative results. The peasants subsequently tried harder on the small private plots which largely supported their own household. By 1937 these supplied half the nations fruit and vegetables and more than 70% of the milk and meat.¹⁴ This relic of private enterprise became an indispensable central sector of the Soviet Union's food supplies. This shows that perhaps the smaller plots were not as inefficient as they have been portrayed.

Agricultural policy was ill-considered. Stalin had not predicted the extent of the upheaval which collectivisation would cause or of the strong resistance it would arouse. Moreover, he did not respond to the early signs of failure or adapt his policies but stuck firmly to his initial plans. These are definite failings on his part. He saw no victims, just enemies, who needed beating down, taking out, by whatever degree of force was necessary. McCauley concluded 'the population must have been frightened'¹⁹, which seems like an understatement, considering the number of people killed or imprisoned.

The pattern that emerged after the left turn epitomised the 'whole of the so-called second October²⁰.' There were many crises which led to more bit-part solutions, thus creating not only a self-perupating chaos, but also a self-justifying policy of coercion and emergency measures to deal with it. Stalin should have avoided these crises by making more considered decisions and not acting in such haste. It is clear however, that in agricultural policy, Stalin was the only key figure. He decided all the policies.

While the offensive against the peasantry was a disaster, one of Stalin's motives was to end the state's dependence on an external force outside his control, and therefore considered to be hostile. After encountering peasant resistance to grain procurement and dekulakisation, instead of withdrawing Stalin widened the conflict because his aim was to forever destroy the potential power of the conservative peasants who were the biggest class. Bullock wrote that it was 'an economic disaster, but politically...a major victory.'²¹ If Stalin is to take credit for the realisation of his political goals he must also accept the responsibility for the obvious failings in economic and human terms of his agricultural policy.

There is no doubt among historians that industry was more successfully reformed than agriculture. This was because unlike the problems presented by the backwardness of Russian agriculture, which the Communists were unable to understand or integrate into their Marxist scheme, the industrialisation of Russia had always been seen as the key to their success in creating a socialist society. Stalin felt more comfortable dealing with the industrial reform. The Communists had the advantage that here was a world with which they were familiar and in which their plans for expansion aroused the enthusiasm of the party and never encountered the open resistance of the conservative peasants.

When Stalin initiated the modernisation Russian industry was in a very poor state. In 1927, in spite of the recovery spearheaded by the New Economic Policy, industry was still only producing at 1913 levels²² and was very far behind the industrialised West. Russia was a backward land with few cities. The industrial workforce in 1927 was only 2.5 million²², a tiny proportion of the population. Stalin decided that industrialisation should be carried out using a demanding five-year plan system. Stalin declared war on the inefficiencies of Russia's past. The war image was reflected when the plans concentrated on heavy industry. These were the materials necessary to wage war. Stalin placed great importance on iron and steel because he saw them as the basis of industrial growth in the west. The basic aims of the 5-year plans were to convert the USSR from a backward agricultural country to a leading industrial power, to effect the complete collectivisation of agriculture, and to transform the very nature of society. Gosplan, the central planning office, set production targets for each industry, such as coal, gas steel, and ship building, which had to be met after five years. From these targets every factory devised its own targets for every worker. Stalin favoured this centralisation because it allowed a concentration of power, in his hands. Industrialisation was seen by all in the party as the key to a successful socialist society. Stalin faced little opposition as he shaped the industrial changes. There was no key figure like Bukharin who presented an effective alternative. Stalin was the only person who was responsible for the policy. People worked under him, not alongside or above him.

The initial plan (1928-33) focused on the build up of heavy industry and defence at the expense of agriculture and consumer welfare. In the plans Stalin demanded the impossible, through 'hopelessly optimistic'²⁴ targets. For example, he demanded industrial production to increase 180%²⁴. He used the slogan 'there are no fortresses that cannot be conquered by the Bolsheviks'²¹to stir up patriotic fever amongst the workers. Existing factories had to expand and people had to work longer hours. Stalin set up labour camps in remote areas of Russia where prisoners worked, in terrible conditions, on dams, factories and canals. Huge new factories and cities like Magnitogorsk were constructed in remote areas east of the Ural mountains and Siberia. The state was able to use the profits to reinvest in industry. Here no wages were paid and millions died.

There are statistical examples of success, although many have suggested they were doctored for propaganda purposes. Stalin said his changes led to economic success, but the figures he used to show this have been described as 'a shower of glittering and often incompatible statistics'²⁵. Bullock said of Stalin's figures 'soviet statistics have long been a subject of continuing controversy'¹⁷. Coal production increased from 35.3 million tonnes to 64.3 million tonnes. Under the second plan it increased to 128 million tonnes. Figure 3 (Index numbers of Soviet Economic Development) shows the massive increases. It shows how Electricity production rose over 700% between 1928 and 1937 and how steel production rose by over 400% in the same period. These were phenomenal increases.

The targets set were often unrealistic. Russia produced 3.3 million tonnes of pig iron in 1928; by the end of 1932 Stalin had set a target of 17 million. The electricity producers were told to increase output from 5 million kilowatt hours to 22 million, a staggering 440%. Those who questioned the targets were denounced as wreckers or enemies of the people. This was a method Stalin used to make people obey him.

Bullock wrote that elements of the plan were successful, that 'the magic worked²¹.'While in the first plan only the oil industry reached its target all industries advanced tremendously during those years. Output was raised in every case, in contrast to the slumping west. For example, the six million tonnes of steel was a long way from the 10 million demanded but up 50 percent on the starting figure²⁶.Figure 4 (The First 5 Year Plan) shows the achievements were almost as high as the targets. It shows coal production rose from 37 million tonnes to 68 million tonnes when the target was 78 million tonnes²⁷. Under the five year plans a genuine giant leap was achieved in industry, without which Russia would surely not been able to recover from the German attack of 1941 to continue and eventually win the war. The foundations to make Russia a major industrial power were laid during the first Five Year Plan and completed during the Second. It is thought that in 1937 total production was nearly four times higher than in 1928²⁸. This was a remarkable, commendable and lasting achievement. The Second Five Year Plan corrected many mistakes. It concentrated on industrial techniques and efficiency but also promoted improvements to workers conditions. Figure 5 (The Second 5 Year Plan) shows even better rises. It shows how pig iron production increased by more than 425% from 4 million tonnes to 17 million tonnes²⁹. New industries were established like automobile manufacture. Industry was dispersed wider into the Urals in the east. Stalin appealed to national pride to quicken the rate of progress, claiming old Russia was always beaten in wars and portraying certain workers as heroes. McCauley backed the changes: 'the impossible targets galvanised people into action'³⁰.It 'achieved more than orthodox advice'². McCauley also said that 'real wages increased greatly'³¹ during the second plan. Stalin can take all of the credit for this progress.

However, there were many serious shortcomings. The improvement was still set against a background of inefficiency often as great as on the farms. The plans did not encapsulate 'quality and innovation'³². They were merely quantitative totals and this required more and more bureaucrats. In Stalin's economy appearances were everything. Lynch said that organisation was so bad that 'the term plan is misleading'⁴¹. Many of the peasant workers had not even seen a machine before. Stalin must take responsibility for these faults.

There are many specific examples of Stalin again showing a lack of understanding, playing a negative role. Without even attempting to present a reasoned case, Stalin made a surprising appearance at the Council of Commissars and shockingly insisted that the already ambitious figures, which Gosplan proposed for the five-year Plan, should be increased by up to (and in some cases exceeding) 100%. The results of this 'wilful'⁶ method of planning, which Stalin introduced, can be illustrated in the case of the development of synthetic rubber. The first batch of the material produced by a new experimental method became available in January 1931. Against all the engineers' advice it was decided to go ahead and build one or maybe even two factories. Stalin however wanted TEN factories before the end of the first five year plan. Not including the numerous unsolved technical problems this meant limited construction resources were spread out over ten sites. Bullock claims that the result was that starts were made on only three factories during 1932-33; the rest were not built either in the first or second five year plan⁶. This intervention was clearly unhelpful and counter-productive. Stalin contributed more to the chaos than to its resolution.

Stalin's obsession with scale was matched by his unrelenting, often impossible insistence on speed. Not only did he throw the balance of the Five Year Plan into chaos by doubling the target figures, even though this was not practical Stalin also demanded the plan should be done in four years. Once again the impact of this intervention was negative leading to constant disruption of production schedules, maximisation of waste and the encouragement of an unplanned scramble for the limited resources of material and labour, hardly what was envisaged. Surely, these resources could have been managed better.

As in the case of the collective farms, Stalin was obsessed with what Fitzpatrick called 'gigantomania'⁶the worship of size for its own sake. He demanded flagship industrial complexes be built, like the kolkhozoy, on a scale which surpassed Russia's resources to construct or operate. The result was that they either took far longer to complete than was economical, and then were constantly subject to breakdowns or were left unfinished. Similar emphasis on the spectacular from the 'heroic'⁶ deeds of Stakhanovites showed how little Stalin understood the steady, systematic rhythm of work needed to make a modern industrial plant produce successfully and efficiently. If this approach had been followed Russia would certainly have performed more efficiently. This was another self-imposed limit on economic progress. Similarly, the economy would have performed better if Stalin had more freely adopted western technologies, rather then taking the view that outside ideas were counter revolutionary.

I think Stalin initiated too much change, too quickly. It should not be forgotten that as in agriculture many thousands lost their lives. Food was short, conditions awful and lives were cheap. Never before had a population of 150 million been subjected by its government to so much change in the space of just four years. However, many think that Stalin had to initiate the changes at such pace to avoid being smashed by the west.

Stalin claimed the advances were an unparalleled success which anywhere else would have been thought of as miraculous. The upheaval was on such a large scale that people may be impressed into subconsciously supporting Stalin. Ward wrote that 'forced industrialisation gave birth to a world of two extremes. Somehow or other the two sides of the coin must be kept in mind'³³. The question should be asked about Stalin's economy - what sort of success and how measured?

There is a common consensus that industrialisation was more economically successful than collectivisation. How much, if anything, the former owed to the latter is debatable. Preobrazhensky, the leading economist among the left Bolsheviks, original argument in favour of 'squeezing'³⁴ the peasants had been the need of 'primitive Socialist accumulation'³⁴ to provide the funds for financing the industrialisation. The weak agricultural system with hungry peasants did not provide as much help to industry as it could have done. Evidence of this is that under half the surplus product obtained from agriculture was in industrial development at the start of the Five year plan; by 1932, 18 percent; and by the end, almost nothing²². The changes initiated by Stalin had clearly worsened the situation with industrial development receiving much less support from the agricultural sector of the economy.

The question remains could this have been achieved without Stalin? This is a fundamental point in deciding to what extent Stalin can take the credit for the economic progress. When looking for the influence of others repeatedly we see that Stalin rode rough shod over any other suggestions. Bukharin, who wanted a more gradual approach based on creating a consensus, was marginalised and executed after a show trial in 1938.

When the impossible dates were not met, Stalin showed the brutality and inflexibility of his views. He falsely denounced those involved as guilty of crimes such as sabotage, wrecking and conspiracy, concentrating especially on the former bourgeois and foreign specialists who were convenient scapegoats, but on whom Soviet industry was heavily dependant for technical and managerial expertise. Once again he played a negative role in the progress. In this case Stalin was forced to recognise that the cost of losing their services could be fatal to the success of the Plan, but he never abandoned his suspicions or his belief that the way to achieve the maximum out of anyone in a position of responsibility was to keep them in a permanent state of insecurity. Russia would have progressed more without Stalin or if he had used his powers in a less brutal fashion.

It is difficult to find other leaders who played any significant role in formulating Russian economic policy.

Loyalty to Stalin ... was based principally on the conviction that there was no-one to take his place, that any change of leadership would be extremely dangerous, and that the country must continue on its present course, since to stop now or attempt a retreat would mean the loss of everything.³⁵

The quote says that many people would not say a word against Stalin because they thought chaos would ensue if Russia changed course even slightly. This quote epitomises the reasons why Stalin was the only key economic figure - he did not want anyone else and the people did not want anyone else. Evidence that Stalin was rarely questioned was that at the 16^th Party congress, when Stalin called for recognition of his 'rural October'³⁶, not one of the 2100 delegates questioned his claim. McCauley said that 'key decision making was centred in Stalin's own chancery, presided over by a trusted official, Poskrebyshev'³⁷. Stalin ruthlessly maintained this sole power. In 1936 he introduced measures which prevented any body meeting as a group and taking counsel together independent of him³⁷. McCauley wrote:

Stalinism flowered in a responsive soil. Without his army of willing cohorts Stalin could not have propelled the USSR into breakneck industrialisation'³⁶

These examples show how much Stalin was in charge and how he relied on others to carry his ideas out, as he did with Poskrebyshev and his other willing executioners, like the shock brigades. As well as purging those actively opposing his policy, they struck fear into the rest and made them work harder. Centralisation had the decisive advantage for Stalin of allowing him to maintain control and to intervene, arbitrarily, when it was unexpected by sending someone like Molotov or Kaganovich to investigate and get a grip on situations which were out of control. These people carried out Stalin's wishes either because they were scared of him or because they were dedicated to the cause.

Stalin had considerable self belief and self reliance. Few people he encountered impressed him and he cared little about their opinions of him. His sovereign trait was ruthlessness. One of his maxims was that there is 'no room for trust³⁸.' This motto partially explains why people were only ever allowed to work below him and people were never allowed to be key influences. He did not want to ever have to consult or listen to anyone. McCauley described him as having 'no sense of personal loyalty to any of his colleagues, and would turn on anyone if he judged it politically opportune'³⁹. However, Lynch wrote that Stalin 'relied heavily on the theories of Preobrazhensky'⁴⁰, the leading economist in the Bolshevik left who wanted to 'declare war'³⁴ on the peasantry to fund the capital needed for industrialisation. Stalin did not think up all the policies himself. He certainly was not renowned as a political thinker before 1928. He has been accused of 'having no ideas of his own, a parasite who needed a host upon which to live'⁴¹. Historians' have condemned him and do not see him as a success:

Scholarly thinking about Stalin and Stalinism is at present negative. No major scholar has come out with a defence of the Stalin phenomenon.⁴²

This shows that the common consensus is against him. However, as McCauley writes 'Stalinist studies are only in their infancy'⁴³ and as new evidence emerges perhaps scholarly supporters of Stalin will also emerge. Ward also takes this view claiming 'the history of Stalin's Russia is only just beginning'. ⁴⁴

In industry Stalin achieved his aims, the USSR was an industrial super state capable of defending itself against the west. The 'war economy' Stalin wanted had been firmly established by 1939. There were phenomenal production figures in key industries like coal, oil and steel. When Stalin took control of Russia it had just been through revolution and war and was recovering from near economic ruin. Under his rule the USSR was now a powerful nation, second only in industrial output to the USA. One of the reasons Germany failed to defeat the USSR was because Stalin's economic progress had given it enough strength to back up the Red Army and save Communism. The victory in the war was seen as a justification both for the intensity of industrialisation and the enormous human suffering it caused. However, there were other factors in the Russian victory such as tactics, the determination of the people, the roads and the weather.

In agriculture he undoubtedly failed to achieve his aims. He wanted to force the peasants into the framework of a socialist society by working in the factories. He wanted them to provide tax revenue and produce a grain surplus which could be sold abroad to finance industry. There was a tremendous drop in agricultural production because of the policies of forced collectivisation and the extermination of the Kulaks, which also resulted in the famine of 1932. The situation only improved when Stalin conceded and allowed collective farmers to own small plots of land.

Stalin's changes were geared towards the development of the Russian economy for the benefit of the communist state, at the expense of the Russian people who suffered to serve the state, to an extent not seen before in History. They were forced to work long hours, were paid low wages and had a low quality of life and appalling living standard. Stalin achieved the aims of his speech in 1931 and had modernised Russia by 1939. His long term aim as indicated in his speech to industrial managers had been to save communism and he did this in 1941 when Hitler invaded.

Whether successful or not, Stalin was almost solely responsible for the economic development in Russia between 1928 and 1939. There was no effective opposition to Stalin's leadership. This was because the people were terrified by him and those with experience of government, like Bukharin and Trotsky were removed from power. Stalin was the driving force behind all of the major policies of the period.

Bibliography

'Stalin and the Soviet Economy' lecture from an American university on the internet

I also used one of my essays from my GCSE History course and am unable to verify the sources.

To what extent can Stalin take credit for Russia's economic progress between 1928-39?

Bibliography