ECPR SG Organised Crime

Assessing Organized Crime: The Case of Germany [1]

by Klaus von Lampe

Introduction

Organized crime is one of the most prominent items on the criminal policy agenda in most, if not all European countries, not least in those that have no traditional organized crime problem. Initially there had been some controversy over whether or not organized crime existed at all in the absence of stereotypical mafia-like associations. [2] Today, policy makers, law enforcement officials and the general public consider this issue closed. They are concerned with the concrete nature, extent and dynamics of organized crime.

In many countries and on the international level efforts have been made over the past few years to assess the state of organized crime to determine the seriousness of the problem and to provide a basis for devising and implementing countermeasures.

In Germany, the federal police agency Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) has been drawing up an annual report since 1992 that is meant to reflect on the situation of organized crime. Since 1999 the report incorporates an assessment of the “organized crime potential” of specific criminal groups (Bundeskriminalamt, 2002a; Meywirth, 1999). Other agencies are working on an explicitly threat-based assessment of crime groups, including the Queensland Crime Commission and the Queensland Police Service with their Project Krystal (Queensland, 1999), the United Nations’ Center for International Crime Prevention (CICP) with its Global Program on Transnational Organized Crime (United Nations, 1999), and the Council of the European Union which pursues a plan to study organized crime on the European level (Council of the European Union, 2002) based on a methodology devised by the Ghent University’s Crime Research Group (Black et al., 2000; 2001).

Before the background of these efforts, this paper discusses the possibilities and limits of making a meaningful assessment of organized crime in Germany as one of the countries without traditional organized crime. [3] In the first section, a methodology for a meaningful assessment of organized crime is outlined. It is argued that such a methodology currently lacks the necessary empirical and theoretical underpinning to form the basis for any reliable judgement on the nature, extent and significance of organized crime. The second section reflects on the available quantitative and qualitative data on organized crime and tentatively examines what inferences can be drawn.

Assessing Organized Crime: A General Framework

The assessment of organized crime encompasses a descriptive and an analytical component: We want to know how organized crime manifests itself and how bad the problem really is.

If there existed so-called traditional organized crime in Germany in the sense of a nation-wide criminal organization with a clearly defined membership, one would be tempted to adopt a simple and straightforward approach, consisting mainly in a head count of members and an inventory of activities. Unfortunately from a methodological point of view, the crime picture in Germany does not lend itself to such simplistic conceptions.

This is not to say that so-called traditional organized crime from other countries was irrelevant. In fact, Germany is believed to be, for example, an area of operation for Chinese Triads and Italian mafia-type organizations (Flormann and Krevert, 2001). But they are only small facets of a much more complex landscape (Bundeskriminalamt, 2002a) which requires a more sophisticated approach.

When we set out to assess organized crime we have to answer five questions:

1. What, in basic terms, is organized crime? Or, put in another way, what do we want organized crime to be?

2. What are the crucial properties or dimensions of organized crime?

3. What are the impacts or social consequences of organized crime?

4. How are the different manifestations of organized crime related to different types of impact?

5. How can valid and reliable data be obtained?

Empirical Referents

The first question is answered by linking the elusive concept of organized crime to specific empirical referents. Whatever the choice may be, it profoundly influences the direction the assessment process is taking.

When we equate organized crime with certain types of criminal activities, namely the provision of illegal goods and services, the assessment will focus on aspects such as the characteristics and properties of illegal markets (Porteous, 1998; Reuter and Petrie, 1999). When, in contrast, criminal structures are considered the pivotal issue, then factors like the number, size and composition of criminal groups will be decisive (Albini et al., 1995; Amir, 1999; Black, 2000; 2001; Galeotti, 1998; Gastrow, 1998). In this instance the nature and extent of illegal markets would be treated merely as contextual variables. Other approaches might emphasize systemic conditions such as underworld power structures (Reuter, 1987; 1994) or corrupt alliances between criminals and public officials (Block, 1983:57; Chambliss, 1978).

The most common approach to the assessment of organized crime seems to be one that centers around a diffuse concept of criminal groups which encompasses a wide variety of patterns of criminal cooperation regardless of their concrete function and structure.

While such a broad scope is desirable in order to embrace all relevant phenomena, the concept of criminal groups sets potentially unclear and misleading parameters. The term criminal group carries with it a connotation of integrated, stable and durable structures that have an existence and behavior independent of the behavior of its members. This connotation is at odds with the notion that the category of criminal group also comprises more dynamic and fluid network structures (Black et al., 2001:23).

If network structures are to be considered, it appears logical, for the sake of clarity, to replace the concept of criminal groups by the more elementary and more concise concept of criminal networks.

A criminal network is a set of dyadic ties that can be exploited for criminal purposes (von Lampe, 2001b). The network concept is more comprehensive and inclusive than that of criminal groups because relations that can be used for the commission of criminal acts are inherent in any type of criminal cooperation, regardless of the organizational framework, and therefore constitute “the least common denominator of organized crime” (McIllwain, 1999:304; Potter, 1994:116).

Furthermore, the network concept is less bias prone than that of criminal groups.

Since the existence of criminal groups as superindividual entities is linked to factors that are not immediately visible, the assessment becomes susceptible to misinterpretations and an overrating of groups that are defined by superficial characteristics such as ethnic make-up. In contrast, it is a comparatively simple task to ascertain the existence of networks because criminally exploitable ties are manifested in every collusive criminal act.

At the same time it needs to be stressed that the network approach is not ignorant of group structures. They can be captured by the concepts of form and content of network relations (Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982:15).

Contextuality

Having thus laid a conceptual foundation by selecting criminal networks as the key empirical referent, the next logical step would be to specify properties or dimensions as the basis for distinguishing among different types of criminal networks.

The number of network attributes is potentially limitless. As long as the assessment remains on a purely descriptive level, any characteristic that may vary from one criminal network to the other is suitable.

In contrast, a more analytical approach that aims at assessing the social impact of criminal networks needs to focus on those attributes that are known to have some significance in this regard. This implies that the specification of dimensions needs to be done with a view to the broader context within which criminal networks exist and on the basis of a sufficiently detailed knowledge of the pertinent processes.

It seems safe to say that at present this knowledge is not available. There is no empirically informed theoretical conception that spells out the correlations between different network attributes and the immediate and broader environment of criminal networks, for example the relations between structural properties and the capacity to inflict damages (Besozzi, 1997).

One might add, that the resources that are currently being invested in a refinement of situation reports would perhaps be better spent on empirical research and theory construction to avoid making the second step before the first. But this is a political issue that must be pondered elsewhere.

What is feasible at the moment, I would argue, is educated guesswork. On this basis one can start with a tentative outline of the contextual aspects that have to be taken into account in the analysis of criminal networks. I suggest a model (figure 1) that represents three concepts and their relations with the concept of criminal networks: the task environment, the broader social context and the institutional framework. [4]

Figure 1: A Model of the Contextuality of Organized Crime

Criminal networks, it is assumed, operate in a task environment consisting of differential opportunities for predatory and victimless crime. The task environment, it is further assumed, is shaped and influenced by social and institutional factors.

Institutional factors include authoritative definitions of illegality by which certain kinds of conduct are criminalized, as well as efforts to control these and other types of illegal behavior. Social factors influencing the task environment of criminal networks include the demand for illegal goods and services and the vulnerabilities to victimization that emanate, for example, from certain behavioral patterns or life styles (Hindelang et al., 1978; Cohen and Felson, 1979).

The model further implies that criminal networks are directly influenced by the respective social and institutional context. While the institutional influence is understood to be primarily manifested in the type, direction and intensity of law enforcement intervention, the significance attached to the social context relates, for example, to sociocultural factors that facilitate the exploitation of social relations for criminal cooperation (Kleemans and van de Bunt, 1999; Paoli, 2002:84-86) and to economic factors that influence the incentives and opportunities for entering into criminal relations (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960).

Criminal networks, in turn, are expected to impact upon their task environment, as well as on the broader social and institutional context.

The effects of organized crime are commonly lumped together in an undifferentiated concept of harm that “covers economic, emotional, physical, intellectual, and political damage” (Black et al., 2000:36; Queensland, 1999:31). The model, in contrast, suggests that at least a distinction needs to be made between the impact on society in terms of material and immaterial damages, and the specific effects of manipulating institutional decision-making processes. These processes, that in combination constitute the rules of the game for self-interest seeking, include, first of all, political decisions, but it seems justified to also consider decisions by non-governmental entities, such as business corporations or private media, that are influenced in an effort to protect and promote criminal interests. Consider, for example, a company being prevented, by illegitimate means, from taking legal action against the criminal practices of a competitor, or a newspaper being prevented from coverage of certain illegal activities.

It should be stressed that the two types of harm, the infliction of damages and the manipulation of institutional decisions, are not necessarily correlated. Instead of undermining the legitimate social order, predatory crime, for example, may well lead to its consolidation by strengthening public support for law enforcement.

Finally, the assessment has to take into account that organized crime might even have benefits, although this probably applies more to third world countries where organized criminal activities may provide capital for economic development (Shelley, 1999:2).

The model serves to underscore the importance of a holistic approach to organized crime. In view of the complex interrelations that need to be considered it would make no sense to examine crime networks isolated from their environment. The underlying working hypothesis is that contextual factors significantly influence how criminal relations are shaped and structured, what illegal activities in terms of type and volume emanate from these combinations, and how they impact on society.

The model also suggests that processes and relationships may differ because they occur within differing contexts. Conventional conceptions assert that organized crime, despite its complexity, in the end is only a one dimensional phenomenon in the sense that all manifestations can be ordered on a scale from bad to worse. Attributes such as size, structural sophistication or the capacity to use violence tend to be treated as complementary indicators of the increasing dangerousness of criminal groups. In contrast, I would argue that group or network attributes as well as the factors describing the immediate and broader environment can take on different meanings in different constellations and under different circumstances.

The use of violence, for example, may be a demonstration of strength and a challenge to the monopoly of power of the state in one instance and a sign of weakness in another where more sophisticated means to pursue goals are unavailable.

In a similar fashion, complex structures with a hierarchy and a division of labor may be considered an efficient form of criminal organization under some conditions and as too inflexible and too vulnerable to law enforcement under others.

As a consequence, the assessment cannot be based on an established set of cause-and-effect relationships from which inferences are drawn about the significance of specific manifestations of organized crime. Even if we knew, for example, of every hierarchically structured criminal group in Germany, we would not be able to determine the level of threat implied by this observation, given that these groups may differ with regard to the functions they perform, be it social, economic or quasi-governmental (von Lampe, 2001b), with regard to the areas of crime they are involved in, or with regard to the social context in which they operate.

Whether the difficulties in modelling organized crime with any reasonable certainty may eventually be overcome is an open question. While the difficulties seem to result primarily from a lack of data and a paucity of theory, they may as well be due to the fact that organized crime has to be perceived of as an open system that is simply too complex and multifaceted to yield readily to a positivistic scheme based on a single holistic concept. The attempt to account for every concrete manifestation, then, would lead to an “evaporation by operationalization” of the concept of organized crime (van Duyne et al., 2001:55-57).

In any case, when we analyze and interpret the available information on organized crime in Germany, we cannot expect to arrive at a meaningful judgement. What is possible, I would argue, is to put the snippets of data in perspective before the background of our provisional model and to discuss what cautious inferences might be drawn.

Data Sources

The existing data that may be considered for being used to assess organized crime include, on an aggregate level, the official crime statistics and the statistics on organized crime cases that are included in the annual situation report issued by the BKA. Also potentially relevant are social statistics and surveys on the consumption of and demand for illegal goods and services. On the micro level we find a fairly large number of individual cases that are more or less well documented in judicial records and in media accounts.

Official Crime Statistics

Official crime statistics have been used to assess the nature and extent of organized crime, especially prior to the introduction of organized crime reports. The underlying notion is to assume that certain types of crime are commonly committed by collaborating criminals, for example drug trafficking, motor vehicle theft and container theft (Gehm and Link, 1992:492; Gemmer, 1974:530; Kerner, 1973:166; Stümper, 1985:10). Other types of crime are viewed as quintessential organized criminal activities, for instance extortion of protection payments (Fundermann, 1985). A third category of offenses that could be seen as indicative of criminal networks are crimes which by definition require the cooperation of two or more criminals, for example gang theft under sec. 244 of the German Criminal Code. Finally, the German Criminal Code contains a provision (sec. 129) against the creation of, participation in and support for a criminal association. The provision goes back to the repression of the political opposition in Prussia and imperial Germany in the 19th century and requires a cohesive organizational entity more typical of political groups than of criminal groups (Fürst, 1989). Accordingly, sec. 129 has only a limited scope with regard to organized crime.

Despite the links between organized crime and certain offense categories, a number of reservations have to be made about using crime statistics for assessing organized crime. Organized-crime related offenses are typically included in much broader offense categories that cover a wide range of different and probably more frequently occurring criminal activities. Cases of extortion of protection payments, for example, fall in the general category of extortion (Krevert, 1997:95). Organized motor vehicle theft is included in the overall category of motor vehicle theft which also comprises cases of joyriding (Kerner, 1973:166; Sehr, 1995:13). Even where a relatively clear definitional distinction exists in the criminal code between individual and collective crimes, the latter are not always separately recorded for statistical purposes, namely involvement in a criminal association under sec. 129 and gang theft under sec. 244. Where gang crimes do form separate categories in the statistics, the number of cases is low. Receiving of stolen goods as a member of a gang under sec. 260 and 260a of the Criminal Code, for example, accounted for 556 cases out of a total of 22,220 cases of receiving in 2001 (Bundeskriminalamt, 2002b). For the production and distribution of drugs as a member of a gang under sec. 30a of the Narcotics Act, 396 cases were recorded out of a total of 246,518 narcotics violations and compared with 79,787 trafficking and smuggling offenses with no established gang dimension (Bundeskriminalamt, 2002b).

Where the absolute number of cases is low, this may have to be ascribed to underreporting, a problem that is inherent in all crime statistics based solely on police recorded offenses. Beyond that, the “dark figure” could be especially high for organized-crime related offenses given the absence of direct victims in illegal markets and a potentially lower propensity to report offenses out of fear of retaliation. In turn, the greater the reliance on the active detection of crimes, the more susceptible the statistics become to differential priority setting and bias in tactical and strategic police work. One example for this mechanism may be provided by the enforcement of anti-gambling laws. In the period from 1987 until 2001 between 1,345 and 3,491 cases were recorded. Interestingly, there is a strong negative correlation between the number of cases per year and the share of foreigners among known suspects (Pearson’s R = -0,9052). This suggests a base level of ethnically biased gambling investigations.

Given these various caveats, only very broad-if any-trends in the nature and extent of organized crime can be expected to find expression in the official crime statistics. Among the items that might be considered are the number of recorded offenses, the number and nationality of known suspects, and the damages inflicted through the commission of certain types of crime.

The number of known offenses may shed some light, for example, on the crime opportunities available to and the capacities of (collective) criminal actors. The category of known suspects in organized crime related offenses might be seen as indicative of the numbers of criminals integrated in criminal networks. The share of foreigners among known suspects may point to international ramifications. Finally, the recorded amounts of damage inflicted by the commission of crimes such as theft and fraud could potentially provide a crude impact measure.

Theoretically, there are two approaches to the analysis of the data provided by the official crime statistics; one is to relate the figures to assumed maximum values. However, the maximum levels that could be defined with any certainty would be without practical relevance, for example the total number of motor vehicles in Germany as the maximum value for cases of motor vehicle theft. Below these levels it seems impossible, given the lack of a sound theoretical basis, to define critical values as absolute reference points for the analysis.

The other approach is a comparative one, either in time or in space, in the latter instance provided that comparable cross-national data are available. [5]

When we focus on possible trends in the national context of Germany, under the assumption that organized crime constitutes a coherent phenomenon one would expect a more or less uniform development of all crimes with an organized crime connotation. This would allow to compare two points in time and to give a crude judgment on whether or not the problem has become worse and more and different efforts need to be made in response.

Assuming, on the other hand, that the concept of organized crime comprises a myriad of complex and multifaceted phenomena, a heterogeneous development would be more likely.

Looking at six selected types of crime in the 15-year-period between 1987 and 2001 and two more recently introduced offenses over an eight-year-period from 1994 until 2001, we find that indeed the picture is mixed and no overall trend can be discerned.

Some crimes, such as drug trafficking (figure 2) and alien smuggling (figure 3), show a steady and substantial increase in the number of offenses and the number of known suspects especially since the early 1990s. [6] Money laundering (figure 4), an offense introduced by the Anti-Organized Crime Act of 1992, shows a similar trend. A less consistent upward trend, possibly due to the lower absolute number of cases, characterizes pimping (figure 5).

Figure 2: Drug Smuggling/Trafficking under Sec. 29 Narcotics Act